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1. Introduction 
Over the last two decades, many European countries experienced an increase in female 
labour force participation and employment. On average, the participation rate has increased 
from around 55% in the early 1990s to more than 66% in 2008 (Figure 1). In the same period 
the women’s employment rate has moved to the same direction, by increasing from 49% to 
61% (Figure 2). This steady improvement in women’s labour market position has led to a 
significant decline in the gender employment gap, defined as the difference in the 
employment rate between men and women, which have nearly halved since 1990, from more 
than 25% to almost 14% in 2008. The observed aggregate increase in participation and 
employment hides substantial differences both across different groups of women and across 
countries suggesting an important role for cross-country heterogeneity in the factors that 
affect women’s labour market outcomes. 
The existing literature has identified a number of factors that could have contributed to the 
overall changes in women’s labour market behaviour: changes in cultural attitudes towards 
work (especially in countries where participation is traditionally lower), demographic factors 
(with a larger share of population in prime working age), changes in the characteristics of the 
female population (e.g. fertility decisions both in terms of the number of children and age at 
which having the first child) and educational choices. Other pertinent factors include reforms 
of the welfare state and changes of labour market institutions and policies specifically 
targeted at groups with lower attachment to the labour market. Changes in the labour 
market behaviour of women with specific characteristics (e.g. a desire for smaller families) 
may reflect changing preferences (cultural attitudes towards work) but also changes in 
restrictions that prevented women from participating in the past. 
Recent empirical literature (Petrongolo, 2004) has questioned the role played by the growth 
of ‘atypical’ jobs during the last decade, typically part-time and temporary occupations, in 
explaining recent labour market developments. Part-time work represents an opportunity for 
flexible hours of work and for combining wage work with family commitments, especially 
for women. However, in some cases, part-time work might as well be considered as a form 
of underemployment, when lower wages are combined with low job security and weak 
occupational attachment (OECD, 1999). Similarly, temporary contracts may provide firms 
with a useful means of screening workers, and therefore represent stepping-stones towards 
permanent employment. However, they have been frequently used as a cheaper option to 
adjust firm-level employment, especially in countries where regular worker are over-
protected. The incidence of part-time jobs and, to a lesser extent, of temporary jobs is 
traditionally higher among women than men (see Figures 3 and 4). On average, more 
women work part-time in central and northern Europe than in the south, while no major 
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geographical pattern can be detected for men. The incidence of temporary contracts seems 
slightly higher among women than men, although it varies more across countries than across 
genders. Although men and women both experienced an increase in part-time and 
temporary employment over the last 20 years, the progressive deregulation of the labour 
market could not necessarily be gender neutral. As a matter of fact, occupational flexibility 
typically affects men at the beginning and at the end of their working life, whereas women 
are more frequently involved in temporary and part-time occupations throughout their 
working life.1 
As a consequence, on the one hand, the increasing availability of ‘atypical’ jobs and more 
flexible forms of employment may have helped women to better integrate in the labour 
market and narrow the employment gap with men. On the other hand, this integration 
process may have occurred at the expense of increasing gender job segregation, to the extent 
that differences across genders in the ‘quality’ of occupation are not fully explained by 
different preferences or productivity of men and women. 
The objective of the paper is two-fold. The first is to assess the recent trends in women’s 
employment and labour market participation with a focus on the changes in the ‘type’ of 
occupation (temporary vs. regular and part-time vs. full-time) women are involved in. We 
begin our analysis by developing a time-variant country-specific synthetic indicator for 
quantifying the female labour market performance (relative to men) by considering both the 
quantitative (employment and participation) and qualitative (type of contract) dimensions of 
labour market attachment. This is done by estimating simple binary choice regression 
models for the period 1994-2009 for the probabilities of participating in the labour force, 
being employed, working part-time and holding a fixed-term contract, controlling for a 
number of individual and job characteristics. In the second part of the paper, we focus on the 
role played by the interplay of macro-institutional factors and policies and individual 
characteristics in explaining the observed trends and cross-country differences by means of a 
multi-level approach. In particular, we question the role that the reforms towards a model of 
a ‘flexicure’ labour market have played in explaining recent trends in women’s participation. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a brief review of the related 
literature are section 3 describes the data used throughout the analysis. We summarize the 
large quantity of micro-level information available for different European countries and 
across time using synthetic indicators of female labour market performance in section 4. The 
results of the multivariate regression analysis of women's involvement in the labour market 
across time and countries are reported in section 5. Finally, the relevance of the institutional 
framework of the labour market and family policies in explaining the trends and cross-
country differences in woman’s labour market involvement is explored using a multilevel 
approach in section 6. Section 7 concludes. 
2. Literature review 
With foundations in microeconomics, the traditional economic literature on women's 
employment has largely focused on the costs and benefits of paid labour relative to domestic 
                                                   
1 There is a large literature showing that part-time work may have negative effects on wages and 
career prospects (especially in countries where it is widespread). Part-time jobs tend to be more 
frequent in low-qualified occupations with a negative impact on women's career opportunities. In the 
UK and US, mothers are more likely to work in part-time jobs and earn lower wages compared with 
women without children. Mothers working part-time also have significantly lower hourly wages in 
Germany and Sweden (Ermisch & Wright, 1993; Gustafsson, 2006). 
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work and other pursuits. According to neoclassical models of labour supply, a woman's 
attachment to the labour market is strictly related to the balance between her reservation 
wage and her market wage. The reservation wage is the lowest wage rate at which a worker 
would be willing to accept a particular type of job. It depends on several factors and may 
also change over time. In this view, housework and family-care duties typically reduce 
women's involvement in labour force by increasing their reservation wage. Indeed, families 
with women in paid labour need to outsource household labour; hence, when the hourly 
market price for household labour is larger than the hourly woman's market wage, the 
woman typically opts out of the labour force. A large number of research papers has proved 
the negative association between household-related responsibilities and women's 
employment (see, among many others, Goodpaster, 2010; Leigh, 2010; and Munasinghe et al., 
2008). Education has been found as another major determinant of women's employment: by 
increasing women's potential market wages, it affects fertility and labour supply decisions 
(Gustaffsson & Kenjoh, 2008; Euwals et al., 2011). 
Recent research contends that the overall increase in women's labour force participation and 
attachment to work may be attributed to structural changes in the economy that influence 
the demand for, and supply of, women workers. In particular, cultural norms on gender 
roles and welfare state developments are found to be responsible for the general increase in 
women's labour force participation in OECD countries from 1960 to 1990. 
Several studies find that women's employment responds positively to policies alleviating the 
financial burden of child-rearing, both in the form of family-related subsidies (see, for 
example, Bardasi & Gornick, 2003; Jaumotte, 2003; Sánchez-Mangas & Sánchez-Marcos, 2008) 
and fiscal reductions (Eissa & Liebman, 1996; Alesina et al., 2007). In particular, countries 
with more generous parental leave schemes or public childcare facilities are characterized by 
a larger involvement of women in paid labour (see, for example, Berlinski & Galiani, 2007; 
Powell, 1998; Anderson & Levine, 1999; Attanasio, et al. 2008). Interestingly, some 
researchers compare the effectiveness of monetary support versus the public provision of 
child-care services. For example, Apps & Rees (2004) find that, among OECD countries, those 
supporting motherhood through childcare facilities rather than child benefits tend to exhibit 
both higher rates of women's labour supply and higher fertility rates. Similarly, Lundin et al. 
(2008) point out that women's labour supply may be more elastic to the quantity of publicly 
provided childcare facilities than to their price. 
The available evidence on the effect of parental care on the propensity to be employed 
provides mixed results and mostly in the US context. Early studies by Wolf & Soldo (1994) 
and Stern (1995) provide no evidence of a negative relationship between elderly care and 
women's employment. Conversely, more recent findings show that caring for parents living 
outside the household and intergenerational co-residence exerts a large negative impact on 
the labour supply of both men and women (see Ettner, 1996; Heitmueller, 2007; Johnson & 
Lo Sasso, 2000). 
Finally, a number of studies have documented the impact of labour market institutions on 
women's employment and labour market participation in European countries (see, among 
others, Jaumotte, 2003 and Genre et al., 2005 and 2010). They find that labour market 
institutions matter for women's attachment to employment and labour force. In particular, 
according to Genre et al. (2005 and 2010), higher union density, more employment protection 
and more generous unemployment benefits lower participation rates. Conversely, Balleer et 
al. (2009) find that a number of institutional factors, such as labour taxes, union density, 
unemployment benefits and the average number of children, has an impact on women's 
labour force participation rates, although the specific impact varies across age groups and 
countries. 
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3. Data and descriptive statistics 
We combine annual micro-data from two different sources, the ECHP (European 
Community Household Panel) and the EU-SILC (European Union Statistics on Income and 
Living Conditions), to create a unique dataset of comparable household and individual level 
characteristics across countries and over time. 
The ECHP micro-data is a household survey with a common framework conducted across 
EU-15 member states under the supervision of Eurostat. ECHP data were first collected in 
1994, when a sample of 60,500 nationally representative households (i.e. approximately 
130,000 adults aged over 16) were interviewed in 12 member states. Austria has joined the 
project in the second wave in 1995, Finland in 1996 and Sweden in 1997. Therefore, since 
then, the data cover all (old) EU-15 member states. The total duration of the ECHP is eight 
years, running from 1994 to 2001. The dataset includes information on family size and 
composition, living conditions and several income measures. Therefore it provides a source 
of mutually comparable income data of EU member countries at the turn of the 20th and 21th 
centuries. 
EU-SILC is the successor of the ECHP. The EU-SILC provides harmonised cross-sectional 
and longitudinal multi-dimensional micro-data on income and social exclusion in European 
countries. After its start in 2003 with seven European countries, in the 2004 wave it covered 
all old EU-15 member states except Germany, the Netherlands and the UK. Since 2005, the 
dataset involves the 25 EU member states, plus Norway and Iceland, and it is the largest 
comparative survey of European income and living conditions. The 2009 wave has been 
recently released. 
In order to obtain a unique dataset of comparable household and individual level 
characteristics across EU countries within the period 1994-2009, we limited the analysis to the 
EU-15 member states2 and selected individual and household characteristics. Summary 
statistics of the women and men samples are presented in Tables 1 and 2. All illustrative 
materials (Tables and Figures) can be found in the Annex. 
The overall sample includes 1,657,367 individuals between 25 and 64 years of age of which 
851,010 are women and 806,357 are men. The employment and participation rates stand at 
59% and 66%, respectively, for the female sample, and increase to approximately 80% and 
86%, respectively, for the male sample. The percentage of highly educated women and men 
is 27% and women are slightly more represented than men among the lowest educated 
individuals. Over 65% of respondents in both samples describe themselves as live in-couple. 
42% of women and 23% of men live in households with at least one child under 14 years of 
age, and 18% of them live in households with at least one pre-school age child. Co-living 
with elderly (that is, individuals with 70 years old or more) involves just 6% of all 
individuals in our sample. Among those living as a couple, approximately 27% reported that 
their partner has achieved a lower or an upper secondary education (ISCED 0-2 and ISCED 
3-5); 20% reported highly-educated partners (ISCED 5-7). The variable ‘cycle’ measures the 
business cycle frequencies of national GDP over the survey years, 1994-2009. This variable 
has been obtained by implementing the filter proposed by Hodrick & Prescott (1997).3 
                                                   
2 Namely, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. 
3 Italy and Spain are over-represented in the sample (16% of the surveyed respondents live in Italy 
and 11% live in Spain). 
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Table 1. Summary statistics: Female sample 
  Variable Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
Individual 
characteristics 
employed 851010 0.594 0.491 0 1 
active 851010 0.656 0.475 0 1 
male 851010 0.000 0.000 0 0 
age 851010 44.269 11.078 25 64 
ISCED02 832447 0.382 0.486 0 1 
ISCED35 832447 0.344 0.475 0 1 
ISCED57 832447 0.274 0.446 0 1 
single 844864 0.189 0.392 0 1 
incouple 844864 0.687 0.464 0 1 
separated 844864 0.018 0.132 0 1 
divorced 844864 0.067 0.250 0 1 
widowed 844864 0.039 0.193 0 1 
Household 
characteritsics 
children 851010 0.713 1.008 0 15 
child 851010 0.422 0.494 0 1 
child06 851010 0.179 0.383 0 1 
child03 851010 0.096 0.295 0 1 
child36 851010 0.113 0.317 0 1 
child614 851010 0.259 0.438 0 1 
old70 851010 0.060 0.238 0 1 
pISCED02 851010 0.276 0.447 0 1 
pISCED35 851010 0.258 0.438 0 1 
pISCED57 851010 0.198 0.398 0 1 
Trend year 851010 2003 4.983 1994 2009 cycle 842730 0.006 1.958 -8.636 4.172 
Country of residence 
DK 851010 0.044 0.206 0 1 
NL 851010 0.070 0.255 0 1 
BE 851010 0.045 0.207 0 1 
FR 851010 0.074 0.262 0 1 
IE 851010 0.043 0.203 0 1 
IT 851010 0.156 0.362 0 1 
GR 851010 0.060 0.237 0 1 
ES 851010 0.111 0.314 0 1 
PT 851010 0.054 0.227 0 1 
AT 851010 0.043 0.204 0 1 
FI 851010 0.068 0.252 0 1 
SE 851010 0.048 0.213 0 1 
DE 851010 0.087 0.282 0 1 
LU 851010 0.035 0.183 0 1 
UK 851010 0.062 0.241 0 1 
 
  
                                                   
 ISCED02 (pISCED02): lower secondary education of the woman (of her partner); ISCED35 
(pISCED35): upper secondary education of the woman (of her partner); ISCED57 (pISCED57): tertiary 
education of the woman (of her partner). 
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Table 2. Summary statistics: Male sample 
  Variable Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
Individual 
characteristics 
employed 806357 0.797 0.402 0 1 
active 806357 0.857 0.350 0 1 
male 806357 1.000 0.000 1 1 
age 806357 44.229 11.137 25 64 
ISCED02 788367 0.360 0.480 0 1 
ISCED35 788367 0.368 0.482 0 1 
ISCED57 788367 0.273 0.445 0 1 
single 799834 0.257 0.437 0 1 
incouple 799834 0.675 0.468 0 1 
separated 799834 0.013 0.112 0 1 
divorced 799834 0.046 0.209 0 1 
widowed 799834 0.010 0.098 0 1 
Household 
characteritsics 
children 806357 0.435 0.925 0 14 
child 806357 0.225 0.418 0 1 
child06 806357 0.180 0.384 0 1 
child03 806357 0.100 0.300 0 1 
child36 806357 0.112 0.315 0 1 
child614 806357 0.244 0.430 0 1 
old70 806357 0.061 0.239 0 1 
pISCED02 806357 0.278 0.448 0 1 
pISCED35 806357 0.261 0.439 0 1 
pISCED57 806357 0.198 0.398 0 1 
Trend year 806357 2003.000 4.985 1994 2009 cycle 798435 0.012 1.959 -8.636 4.172 
Country of residence 
DK 806357 0.045 0.207 0 1 
NL 806357 0.068 0.253 0 1 
BE 806357 0.044 0.205 0 1 
FR 806357 0.073 0.261 0 1 
IE 806357 0.043 0.202 0 1 
IT 806357 0.159 0.366 0 1 
GR 806357 0.060 0.238 0 1 
ES 806357 0.111 0.314 0 1 
PT 806357 0.053 0.224 0 1 
AT 806357 0.043 0.203 0 1 
FI 806357 0.073 0.260 0 1 
SE 806357 0.049 0.216 0 1 
DE 806357 0.083 0.276 0 1 
LU 806357 0.036 0.187 0 1 
UK 806357 0.059 0.235 0 1 
 
  
                                                   
 ISCED02 (pISCED02): lower secondary education of the man (of his partner); ISCED35 (pISCED35): 
upper secondary education of the man (of his partner); ISCED57 (pISCED57): tertiary education of the 
man (of his partner). 
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4. A micro-data-based unified framework for cross-country comparisons 
The purpose of this section is to present some evidence about trends of women’s labour 
market performance in Europe, which would be valuable for cross-country comparisons. The 
analysis introduces a synthetic index of labour market performance, which measures the 
extent to which women and men can be distinguished from each other on the basis of 
commonly observed social and economic characteristics in different countries and across 
time. The results are thus able to convey information relevant to the ongoing political 
debates about changes in female work status by measuring the degree of distinction between 
women and men along different labour market indicators and controlling for a set of 
standard individual characteristics.4 
The index can be computed for different education and age groups and by splitting countries 
according to the institutional regime they belong to. It can then serve to provide reliable 
answers to questions such as: Are the differences between women and men today larger than 
they were in the recent or distant past? In which countries are these tendencies more 
pronounced? And how rapidly do these differences shrink? Are there differences by 
education or age groups? We compute the index using data capturing conditions in 15 
European countries as recent as 2009, and as early as 1994 and performing statistical tests 
assessing the statistical significance of the observed differences across time. 
Borrowing from Vigdor (2008), who measures differences between native and immigrants in 
the US along cultural and economic lines, we measure differences between men and females 
in Europe using as labour market performance indicators the activity rate, the employment 
rate and the type of contract (permanent vs. temporary, full-time vs. part time). Such an 
approach summarizes the large quantity of micro-level information available for different 
European countries and across time in a way that eases cross-country comparisons. 
Technical details can be found in Appendix 1 of this report. In other words, the procedure 
predicts which individuals are females on the basis of observed characteristics and then uses 
this finding to measure the gap between men and females for a chosen outcome, such as the 
activity rate, by constructing a numeric index. The method requires no prior assumptions 
regarding which characteristics are most effective in distinguishing women from men. 
Moreover, the inclusion of irrelevant characteristics – that is, ones that do not actually help 
distinguish women from men – has no impact on the index. Such an index ranges between 0 
and 1. It can be interpreted as an index of dissimilarity: the larger the distance from 1, the 
more females are different from men along the inspected labour market indicator, controlling 
for other individual characteristics. 
We construct four different indices capturing gaps between women and men in labour 
market participation (activity gap index), unemployment (employment gap index), 
employment with a temporary contract (type of contract index 1) and employment with a 
part-time contract (type of contract index 2), which are detailed in Appendix 2.  
An important methodological achievement of our framework with respect to broad statistical 
analysis of labour market aggregate indicators lies in its ability to separate behavioural 
trends from that simply reflect changes in demographic and social characteristics of men and 
women across countries and over time. Indeed, changes in outcomes reflecting changes in 
preferences and beliefs over and above those stemming from natural demographic trends are 
of particular interest for policy purposes. Our methodological framework uncovers 
                                                   
4 Appendix 1 provides both a general and a more technical overview of the method used to compute 
the index. 
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aggregate tendencies with the ability to control for a variety of confounding factors. In our 
analysis we control for differences in demographic factors using individual information on 
age and the education level as well as in family structure using marital status, partner 
education and number of children. 
The activity index, capturing differences between women and men inside and outside the 
labour market, reveals the behavioural differences more likely to come from the supply side 
of the labour market, whereas the employment index, focusing on gender differences for the 
individuals in the labour market only, captures the behavioural differences more likely to 
come from the demand side. The indices by type of contract are finally designed to uncover 
further differences within employment schemes. 
For each European country and each year between 1994-2000 (ECHP data) and  between 
2004-2009 (EU-SILC data), we compute the four different indicators and perform T-test 
statistics to assess significant difference between the begining and ending of the observed 
time window. The complete list of results is collected in Appendix 2, Tables A1-A4. 
In order to understand the ability of our framework to convey more precise information 
about women’s labour market performance as against the one revealed by the analysis of 
aggregate labour market indicators, we discuss our evidence in contrast to the facts that 
would emerge when using OECD aggregate data. Figures 1-4 show the activity rates, 
employment rate, permanent employment rates and full-time employment rates using the 
Labour Force Statistics collected by OECD, which are separated by gender. Figures 5-8 
display the results of our analysis using our corresponding summary indicators of women-
men gaps. Countries for which the gaps over the period are found to be statistically 
insignificant are depicted using a constant line. 
Both sets of tables point towards the well-known onset of female labour participation and 
employment with a gender gap shrinking over time. However, a closer look at Figures 5-8 
reveals important cross-country differences that were not captured in Figures 1-4. It appears 
that only some of the marked trends in Figures 1-4 are statistically significant, once we 
control for changes in demographic and social characteristics between men and females over 
time. On the other hand, some of the less pronounced trends in Figures 1-4 turn out to be 
instead statistically significant using our methodology in Figures 5-8. It appears, for example, 
that the marked change in female employment in Figure 2 (OECD aggregate data) in 
Belgium and Luxembourg is mainly due to demographic trends and other characteristics of 
the female labour force rather than to changes in preferences and beliefs. Indeed, when 
controlling for these factors, i.e. when looking at the results obtained using our indicators 
(Figure 6) the changes in the employment gap between men and women in Belgium and 
Luxembourg are not statistically significant. On the other hand, minor differences emerging 
from aggregate data can reflect important behavioural differences if other characteristics 
remain roughly constant during the inspected period. For example, the weak increase in the 
female activity rate in Germany (Figure 1) seems to be an important trend in the observed 
period, with a male-female gap closing by about 20% (Figure 5). 
Let us now focus our attention on the information delivered by our different indices within 
countries. 
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Figure 9 plots our four summary indicators of dissimilarity between women’s and men's 
behaviour for each country and over time. Interestingly, the picture that emerges has 
features that are common to most European countries. Firstly, we find a marked increase in 
female labour market participation, which does not correspond to a similarly pronounced 
increase in employment rates. Secondly, there emerges a relevant increase in both temporary 
and part-time employment of women compared to men. This is an important fact that 
deserves further investigation. Although these types of contracts can be chosen in certain 
circumstances, a larger incidence of temporary and part-time jobs for women can also reflect 
a transition phase towards the integration of such a group into permanent and full-time 
occupations. Distinguishing between those different explanations is a complex issue, which 
we cannot address here with the available data. Nevertheless, we continue our explorative 
analysis to document in which countries and for which age and education groups the 
relationship between a higher female labour market participation and higher share of female 
temporary and part-time employment is stronger. 
 
Figure 1. Macro data trends in Europe: Activity rate by gender, 1994-2009 
 
Source: OECD Labour Market Statistics retrieved from http://stats.oecd.org/. 
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Figure 2. Macro data trends in Europe: Employment rate by gender, 1994-2009 
 
Source: OECD Labour Market Statistics retrieved from http://stats.oecd.org/. 
Figure 3. Macro data trends in Europe: Share of temporary jobs by gender, 1994-2009 
 
Source:  OECD Labour Market Statistics retrieved from http://stats.oecd.org/. 
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Figure 4. Macro data trends in Europe: Share of part-time jobs by gender, 1994-2009 
 
Source: OECD Labour Market Statistics retrieved from http://stats.oecd.org/. 
 
Figure 5. Micro-based gender gap index in activity rates, 1994-2009 
 
Source: Own elaborations from ECHP and EUSILC databases. 
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Figure 6. Micro-based gender gap index in unemployment rates, 1994-2009 
 
Source: Own elaborations from ECHP and EUSILC databases. 
 
Figure 7. Micro-based gender gap index in the share of part-time jobs, years 1994-2009 
 
Source: Own elaborations from ECHP and EUSILC databases. 
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Figure 8. Micro-based gender gap index in the share of temporary jobs, 1994-2009 
 
Source: Own elaborations from ECHP and EUSILC databases. 
Figure 9. Synthesis of micro-based gender gap indicators in the labour market in Europe, 
1994-2009 
 
Source: Own elaborations from ECHP and EUSILC databases. 
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Source: Own elaborations from ECHP and EUSILC databases. 
 
 
Source: Own elaborations from ECHP and EUSILC databases. 
 
.8
.8
5
.9
.9
5
1
1995 2000 2005 2010
year
ES
.8
.8
5
.9
.9
5
1
1995 2000 2005 2010
year
FI
.8
.8
5
.9
.9
5
1
1995 2000 2005 2010
year
FR
.8
.8
5
.9
.9
5
1
1995 2000 2005 2010
year
GR
activity_gap employment_gap
parttime_gap temporary_gap
.6
.7
.8
.9
1
1995 2000 2005 2010
year
IE
.6
.7
.8
.9
1
1995 2000 2005 2010
year
IT
.6
.7
.8
.9
1
1995 2000 2005 2010
year
LU
.6
.7
.8
.9
1
1995 2000 2005 2010
year
NL
activity_gap employment_gap
parttime_gap temporary_gap
WOMEN’S LABOUR MARKET PERFORMANCE IN EUROPE: TRENDS AND SHAPING FACTORS | 15 
 
 
Source: Own elaborations from ECHP and EUSILC databases. 
 
For this purpose, we follow Ferrera’s (1996) classification and split countries by institutional 
regimes, distinguishing between the traditional four groups: liberal countries (the UK), 
continental countries (Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Germany, Ireland 
and France), Nordic countries (Denmark, Sweden and Finland) and southern countries 
(Greece, Spain, Portugal and Italy). Observe that, following Siaroff's (1994) intuition, Ireland 
is included among later female mobilization countries. We investigate the correlation 
between female labour force participation and type of employment using the following 
baseline regression model: 
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rates. Male-female participation gaps by the end of the 20th century in Greece, Spain and 
Italy were still around 30%, as opposed to 12.9% in the US. When the other indicator of type 
of employment is taken into consideration (column two) we find a significant negative 
association for all countries, except for the UK (in the liberal regime). 
This evidence thus depicts a picture of Europe where for those countries with higher rates of 
participation, i.e. the UK, a favourable trend in women’s labour market participation is also 
accompanied by a favourable trend in full-time employment. Whereas in the rest of Europe 
(with lower rates of participation), an increase in the number of women in the labour force 
(compared to men) comes at a cost of lower-quality jobs, i.e. of larger shares in temporary 
employment. 
Table 4 collects the results that are obtained when performing the same analysis by age 
groups. It appears that these trends are driven by prime-age women (Table 4), while fewer 
and less pronounced correlations are revealed for old and young women. Finally, Table 5 
collects the results which are obtained by performing the same analysis when splitting our 
sample by education level. Interestingly, we find that these tendencies are not true for skilled 
women. The effects seem to be driven by women in the least skilled group (columns 1-3). 
Table 3. Activity rate, temporary employment and part-time employment 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) 
    
    
I_TEMP  -0.2512  -0.1317 
 (0.174)  (0.169) 
I_TEMP_2 0.1784  0.2115 
 (0.185)  (0.196) 
I_TEMP_3 -1.8602***  -1.7324*** 
 (0.293)  (0.272) 
I_TEMP_4 0.2663  0.1240 
 (0.177)  (0.173) 
I_PART  0.4442*** 0.3899*** 
  (0.122) (0.104) 
I_PART_2  -0.6954*** -0.6860*** 
  (0.154) (0.166) 
I_PART_3  -2.4406*** -1.8006*** 
  (0.334) (0.209) 
I_PART_4  -0.3919*** -0.3329*** 
  (0.124) (0.109) 
Constant 0.9780*** 2.8675*** 4.1492*** 
 (0.031) (0.301) (0.262) 
    
Observations 171 171 171 
R-squared 0.788 0.757 0.819 
Notes: OLS results of model (1). Dep. Variable: Activity I. I_TEMP denotes the type of contract I temporary versus 
permanent, I_PART denotes the type of contract I full time versus part time. The subscript _2, _3, _4 indicates 
institutional regimes: _2 includes continental countries (Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Germany, 
Ireland and France), _3 Southern countries (Greece, Spain, Portugal and Italy), _3 Nordic countries (Denmark, 
Sweden and Finland) and  the group of liberal countries (UK) is the reference category. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4 Activity rate, temporary employment and part-time employment by age groups 
 Prime age Old Young 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
          
I_TEMP  -0.2110  -0.1973 0.0647  0.0942 -0.0135  -0.0876 
 (0.201)  (0.200) (0.097)  (0.072) (0.068)  (0.247) 
I_TEMP_2 0.1059  0.3147 -0.0734  -0.1044 0.0362  0.0904 
 (0.215)  (0.238) (0.101)  (0.079) (0.071)  (0.248) 
I_TEMP_3 -2.3508***  -2.0609*** -0.1906  -0.2097* -0.0764  -0.0113 
 (0.350)  (0.331) (0.126)  (0.118) (0.081)  (0.251) 
I_TEMP_4 0.2754  0.2354 -0.1681  -0.1855** 0.0312  0.1149 
 (0.205)  (0.206) (0.104)  (0.077) (0.071)  (0.249) 
I_PART  0.4607*** 0.4491***  0.0796 0.0859**  0.0105 0.0601 
  (0.106) (0.143)  (0.049) (0.041)  (0.058) (0.173) 
I_PART_2  -0.7658*** -0.8141***  -0.1454* -0.1522**  0.0456 -0.0063 
  (0.151) (0.210)  (0.076) (0.072)  (0.064) (0.176) 
I_PART_3  -2.5758*** -1.8683***  -0.2696 -0.1428  -0.0136 -0.1060 
  (0.366) (0.292)  (0.169) (0.184)  (0.092) (0.187) 
I_PART_4  -0.3738*** -0.3809**  0.0221 -0.0065  -0.0284 -0.1017 
  (0.111) (0.149)  (0.084) (0.069)  (0.071) (0.181) 
Constant 3.4631*** 2.9840*** 4.5391*** 0.9945*** 1.1227*** 1.0373*** 1.0655*** 1.0123*** 0.9352*** 
 (0.282) (0.341) (0.292) (0.081) (0.153) (0.145) (0.043) (0.037) (0.027) 
          
Observations 171 171 171 171 171 171 171 171 171 
R-squared 0.756 0.718 0.792 0.807 0.806 0.810 0.451 0.445 0.460 
 
Notes: OLS results of model (1) by age groups. “Prime age” are individuals between  25-54, “Old” are individuals between  55-64, “Young” are individuals between  15-24.  Dep. 
Variable: Activity I. I_TEMP denotes the type of contract I temporary versus permanent, I_PART denotes the type of contract I full time versus part time. The subscript _2, _3, 
_4 indicates institutional regimes: _2 includes continental countries (Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Germany, Ireland and France), _3 Southern countries 
(Greece, Spain, Portugal and Italy), _3 Nordic countries (Denmark, Sweden and Finland) and  the group of liberal countries (UK) is the reference category. Robust standard 
errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5. Activity rate, temporary employment and part-time employment by education level 
 Unskilled Medium-skilled Skilled 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
          
I_TEMP  -0.0967  -0.0955 -0.0816*  0.0322 -0.1138  -0.0477 
 (0.124)  (0.396) (0.046)  (0.072) (0.089)  (0.206) 
I_TEMP_2 0.1276  0.1908 0.0846  0.2161* 0.2550*  0.1941 
 (0.158)  (0.417) (0.072)  (0.121) (0.135)  (0.229) 
I_TEMP_3 -0.7085***  -0.4538 -0.3161  -0.2608 -0.0672  -0.1354 
 (0.265)  (0.450) (0.196)  (0.171) (0.180)  (0.259) 
I_TEMP_4 0.0604  0.0717 0.1259**  -0.0061 0.0992  0.0253 
 (0.130)  (0.398) (0.049)  (0.076) (0.099)  (0.211) 
I_PART  0.1228 0.0018  -0.2452*** -0.2563***  0.1581 0.1296 
  (0.205) (0.582)  (0.079) (0.097)  (0.245) (0.358) 
I_PART_2  -0.1936 -0.1218  0.0852 -0.0138  -0.1902 -0.1666 
  (0.214) (0.589)  (0.093) (0.122)  (0.249) (0.360) 
I_PART_3  -1.7531*** -1.4816**  -0.5939*** -0.5410**  -0.2128 -0.1223 
  (0.279) (0.619)  (0.208) (0.223)  (0.292) (0.390) 
I_PART_4  0.0819 0.1995  0.3073*** 0.2978***  -0.1480 -0.1089 
  (0.210) (0.584)  (0.082) (0.101)  (0.247) (0.359) 
Constant 1.6223*** 2.4596*** 2.7338*** 1.0444*** 0.9269*** 1.9951*** 1.0842*** 1.0515*** 0.9037* 
 (0.236) (0.179) (0.262) (0.043) (0.021) (0.208) (0.089) (0.156) (0.509) 
          
Observations 171 171 171 171 171 171 171 171 171 
R-squared 0.808 0.833 0.841 0.802 0.836 0.850 0.596 0.589 0.597 
 
Notes: OLS results of model (1) by education levels. “Unskilled” are individuals with primary education only, “Medium-skilled” are individuals with secondary education only, 
“Skilled” are individuals with tertiary higher education. Dep. Variable: Activity I. I_TEMP denotes the type of contract I temporary versus permanent, I_PART denotes the type 
of contract I full time versus part time. The subscript _2, _3, _4 indicates institutional regimes: _2 includes continental countries (Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
Germany, Ireland and France), _3 Southern countries (Greece, Spain, Portugal and Italy), _3 Nordic countries (Denmark, Sweden and Finland) and  the group of liberal 
countries (UK) is the reference category. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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5. Multivariate regression analysis 
5.1 The empirical strategy 
In this section, we use multivariate regression analysis to look at the determinants of 
women’s labour market status and occupational characteristics. We estimate probit models 
for the probabilities of participating in the labour force, being employed, holding a fixed-
term contract and working part-time. Indicating individual i and (discrete) time t by 
corresponding subscripts, our basic regression model specifies the employment status as: 
ijtjjttijtijtijt ctycycletrendagey   X      (2) 
where y is the labour market status (active, employed and type of contract, namely 
temporary and part-time) at time t for individual (female) i in country j, X is a set of 
individual characteristics observed at time t, age are dummies for the age group of individual 
i (25-34; 35-44; 45-54; 55-64) capturing cohort effects, cycle is a business cycle indicator 
(country specific and time variant), trend is a common linear trend and cty are country 
dummies. 
In order to investigate the differences in women’s labour market behaviour across countries 
with different welfare-regimes (which also partly reflect differences in cultural attitudes to 
female labour market participation), we follow the classification used in the previous section 
and divide countries of our sample into four major groups: southern (Spain, Italy, Greece 
and Portugal), Social Democratic (Sweden, Finland and Denmark), liberal (the United 
Kingdom) and continental (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Ireland and 
Luxembourg). The welfare regime is then included among the observed determinants of 
women's labour market performance according to the following specification: 
 
    ijtjtjijtj
ijjttijtijtijt
welfaretrendwelfarewelfare
agewelfarecycletrendagey




X
X
    (3) 
where  ij agewelfare   captures differences across welfare regimes in the age-effects of 
individual i (e.g. individuals of the same age group may behave differently in different 
welfare regimes);  ijtjwelfare X  captures the effect of the welfare regimes on the attitude 
towards work of women with certain characteristics (e.g. does the number of children affect 
differently the participation rate of women in countries like Italy and Sweden?); 
 tj trendwelfare   captures changes over time of the labour market status of women in 
countries characterized by different welfare regimes. 
Finally we account for changes over time in women’s attitude to work by estimating the 
following model where the trend indicator is interacted with the relevant individual 
characteristics: 
    ijtjijttitjttijtijtijt ctytrendagetrendcycletrendagey   XX  (4) 
 where  ijtttrend X  captures changes over time in the labour market status of women with 
certain characteristics (e.g. does the participation rate of women with a high level of 
education change in 2007 with respect to 1994?). Specification 4 is run both for the pooled 
sample (15 countries) and for each welfare regime separately. 
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5.2 Results 
5.2.1 Baseline model 
Table 6 presents the estimation results of specification 2 and provides the impacts of the 
variables of interests on the probability of participating (column 1), being employed (column 
2), holding a fixed-term contract (column 3) and working part-time (column 4). 
Table 6. Female labour market participation and type of occupation 
             
  active employed temporary parttime 
 Coef.  
Std. 
Err. Coef.  
Std. 
Err. Coef.  
Std. 
Err. Coef.  
Std. 
Err. 
Marital status                 
Single                 
incouple -0.071 *** 0.003 -0.044 *** 0.003 -0.021 *** 0.003 0.095 *** 0.004 
separated 0.057 *** 0.007 0.055 *** 0.007 -0.018 *** 0.006 0.019 ** 0.009 
divorced 0.050 *** 0.004 0.029 *** 0.004 -0.014 *** 0.004 -0.016 *** 0.005 
widowed -0.067 *** 0.006 -0.031 *** 0.006 -0.012 ** 0.005 0.066 *** 0.008 
Children                 
No children                 
children -0.038 *** 0.003 -0.031 *** 0.003 0.013 *** 0.003 0.019 *** 0.004 
child 0.043 *** 0.005 0.043 *** 0.005 -0.005   0.005 0.014 ** 0.006 
child03 -0.174 *** 0.004 -0.162 *** 0.003 -0.018 *** 0.003 0.140 *** 0.005 
child36 -0.088 *** 0.003 -0.088 *** 0.003 0.007 ** 0.003 0.142 *** 0.004 
child614 -0.067 *** 0.003 -0.066 *** 0.003 0.023 *** 0.002 0.166 *** 0.003 
Co-habiting 
Elderly                 
no_elderly                 
old70-80 -0.068 *** 0.005 -0.075 *** 0.005 0.012 *** 0.005 0.009   0.007 
old80 -0.025 *** 0.006 -0.015 ** 0.006 -0.011 ** 0.006 0.002   0.009 
Education                 
Low skilled                 
ISCED35 0.122 *** 0.002 0.145 *** 0.002 -0.062 *** 0.002 -0.044 *** 0.003 
ISCED57 0.214 *** 0.003 0.253 *** 0.003 -0.067 *** 0.002 -0.104 *** 0.003 
pISCED03 -0.016 *** 0.003 0.006 * 0.003 0.010 *** 0.003 -0.016 *** 0.004 
pISCED35 0.039 *** 0.003 0.064 *** 0.003 -0.031 *** 0.003 0.007 * 0.004 
pISCED57 0.018 *** 0.004 0.050 *** 0.004 -0.037 *** 0.003 0.011 *** 0.004 
Age                 
Age_25-34                 
age_35_44 0.052 *** 0.003 0.067 *** 0.003 -0.077 *** 0.002 0.024 *** 0.003 
age_45_54 -0.013 *** 0.003 0.013 *** 0.003 -0.113 *** 0.003 0.056 *** 0.004 
age_55_64 -0.295 *** 0.004 -0.247 *** 0.004 -0.128 *** 0.002 0.132 *** 0.005 
Macro                 
trend 0.012 *** 0.001 0.014 *** 0.001 0.002 *** 0.001 0.003 *** 0.001 
cycle 0.003 *** 0.001 0.005 *** 0.001 0.001 *** 0.001 0.005 *** 0.001 
UK                 
DK 0.075 *** 0.005 0.050 *** 0.005 -0.171 *** 0.002 -0.170 *** 0.004 
NL -0.039 *** 0.004 -0.038 *** 0.004 0.169 *** 0.009 0.311 *** 0.005 
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BE 0.018 *** 0.004 -0.058 *** 0.004 0.166 *** 0.008 0.047 *** 0.005 
FR 0.078 *** 0.004 0.019 *** 0.004 0.179 *** 0.008 -0.085 *** 0.004 
IE -0.046 *** 0.005 -0.061 *** 0.006 0.106 *** 0.009 0.036 *** 0.007 
IT -0.077 *** 0.004 -0.116 *** 0.004 0.197 *** 0.007 -0.094 *** 0.004 
GR -0.041 *** 0.004 -0.100 *** 0.005 0.353 *** 0.009 -0.164 *** 0.005 
ES 0.012 *** 0.004 -0.070 *** 0.004 0.391 *** 0.008 -0.160 *** 0.004 
PT 0.159 *** 0.004 0.109 *** 0.005 0.206 *** 0.009 -0.282 *** 0.004 
AT -0.053 *** 0.004 -0.085 *** 0.004 0.059 *** 0.007 0.018 *** 0.005 
FI 0.072 *** 0.004 0.019 *** 0.004 0.264 *** 0.009 -0.224 *** 0.004 
SE 0.100 *** 0.004 0.076 *** 0.004 0.203 *** 0.009 -0.057 *** 0.004 
DE 0.005   0.004 -0.068 *** 0.004 0.154 *** 0.008 0.137 *** 0.005 
LU -0.040 *** 0.006 -0.053 *** 0.006 0.038 *** 0.009 -0.014 * 0.007 
Observations 818168   818168   427128   492929   
Log likelihood -432848.6   
-
473241.1   
-
179740.1   
-
285804.1   
pseudo - R2 0.148   0.128   0.113   0.128   
 
Not surprisingly, the results reported in columns (1) and (2) are qualitative the same, with 
some differences in the magnitude of the impacts. While activity rates are widely used as an 
indicator of labour market involvement, it is increasingly recognized that employment and 
hours worked are the key indicators for assessing women’s labour market integration 
(Jonung & Persson, 1993). One reason is that women’s unemployment is often hidden among 
those defined as inactive because of the low work attachment of women holding to some 
specific groups (typically low-skilled women with young children). Considering the impact 
of household and personal characteristics on women’s labour market status (active and 
employed), the results are in line with those reported in the previous empirical literature. 
Being married is negatively related to women’s participation and employment. Children 
have a negative impact on female participation and the effect is significantly stronger in 
presence of children under 4 years of age. Participation (and employment) goes up gradually 
when the child starts attending school and the child effect reduces significantly only when he 
or she attends secondary school (around 14 years). Also the number of children has a 
significant disincentive effect on labour market participation. Note that the reported 
coefficients should not be interpreted as casual effects, as both participation and fertility may 
be simultaneous decisions. This implies that the casual effect of children on participation can 
be lower than that estimated. 
In the face of the ongoing dramatic development of the aging population in Europe, we also 
include a dummy for the presence in the household of an elderly person above the age of 70 
as a proxy for elder care burden.5 
In many countries the responsibility of providing care for elderly persons is likely to fall on 
families, and in practice on women. Moreover, the choice of having an elderly relative living 
in the household is a better proxy of care burdens than having children. This variable is 
indeed less affected by endogeneity issues that may arise in the estimation as a consequence 
of the possible inverse causal relationship between labour market status and the rational 
choice of having a child (Cipollone & D’Ippoliti, 2011). As expected, the estimated impact of 
                                                   
5 Ettner (1995) points out that, although the decision to care for a senior person and the decision of 
fertility differ in many aspects, the influence of the commitment to caring for the elderly can be 
studied similarly to the commitment towards children. 
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elderly care responsibilities on both participation and employment status is negative and 
significant. 
Education is also another important determinant of the female labour market status. Within 
the context of our model, the control for education is mainly a proxy for the wage rate. 
According to our estimates, a high level of education leads to more participation. The level of 
education of the partner has also a significant impact on female participation and 
employment: the coefficients of the dummies for secondary education and tertiary education 
are indeed positive and highly significant. Finally the age effects show the familiar hump-
shaped pattern in both the participation and employment, implying an increase in the 
probability of participating for the age group 35-44, and then a lower probability for older 
groups. Notice that the probability of being employed is significantly lower only for women 
in the old group (55-64), while the turning point for participation occurs earlier in the life-
cycle. 
After controlling for personal characteristics and country unobserved time invariant effects, 
the trend indicator is positive and significant for both the probability of being employed and 
being in the labour force, implying that on average, the probabilities of participating and 
being employed in 2009 are 0.18  and 0.20 percent higher than in 1994 respectively. 
Columns (3) and (4) provide estimates of the impact of personal/household characteristics 
on the probability of holding a fixed-term contract and working part-time. Temporary work 
is more frequent among single women and women without children. Among women with 
kids, the incidence of temporary workers is larger for those who have children in pre-
primary (3-6 age old) and primary education (6-14 age old). Temporary work arrangements 
are more likely for women with a low level of education and for women with a partner with 
a low level of education. Finally, the probability of holding a fixed-term contract declines 
with age, and this is in line with evidence for Europe which suggests that the share of 
temporary contracts is much higher in the inflow of newly-created jobs than in the existing 
stock.6 
Regarding part-time employment (column 4), the results show that part-time among women 
is largely explained by family ties, the incidence being significantly higher for married 
women with small children. It declines with women’s education levels and, interestingly, 
increases with the partner’s level of education as the presence of a higher family income 
make women more willing to accept a reduction in worked hours in order to reconcile paid 
activity and unpaid domestic labour. Differently from temporary employment, the 
probability of holding a part-time job increases with age. 
5.2.2 Female labour market outcomes and welfare regimes 
Table 7 reports the results of model 3, in which the coefficients of the probit model are 
allowed to vary across countries characterized by different welfare regimes (the base group 
is the UK). 
                                                   
6 See Blanchard & Landier (2002) for France and Dolado et al. (2002) and Guell & Petrongolo (2007) for 
Spain. 
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Table 7. Female labour market participation and type of occupation: Welfare regimes 
             
  active employed temporary parttime 
 Coef.  Std. Err. Coef.  Std. Err. Coef.  Std. Err. Coef.  Std. Err. 
Marital status                 
Single                 
incouple -0.020 *** 0.008 -0.011   0.008 -0.010   0.015 0.146 *** 0.009 
separated 0.046 *** 0.007 0.038 *** 0.007 -0.020 *** 0.006 0.044 *** 0.009 
divorced 0.042 *** 0.004 0.027 *** 0.005 -0.018 *** 0.004 -0.003   0.005 
widowed -0.073 *** 0.005 -0.040 *** 0.006 -0.016 *** 0.005 0.092 *** 0.008 
married*dem 0.004   0.009 0.002   0.010 -0.036 *** 0.014 -0.122 *** 0.009 
married*cont -0.075 *** 0.009 -0.045 *** 0.010 -0.024   0.015 -0.032 *** 0.010 
married*south -0.063 *** 0.009 -0.048 *** 0.010 -0.013   0.015 -0.119 *** 0.010 
Children                 
No children                 
children -0.034 *** 0.003 -0.029 *** 0.003 0.016 *** 0.003 0.020 *** 0.004 
child 0.074 *** 0.008 0.071 *** 0.008 -0.007   0.014 0.019 ** 0.010 
child*dem 0.009   0.009 0.011   0.009 -0.010   0.015 -0.057 *** 0.009 
child*cont -0.018 ** 0.008 -0.015 * 0.009 -0.010   0.014 0.009   0.009 
child*south -0.045 *** 0.008 -0.049 *** 0.009 0.016   0.015 -0.038 *** 0.009 
child03 -0.239 *** 0.010 -0.228 *** 0.010 -0.011   0.019 0.285 *** 0.014 
child03*dem 0.055 *** 0.011 0.061 *** 0.012 0.002   0.022 -0.161 *** 0.011 
child03*cont 0.020 * 0.011 0.031 *** 0.012 -0.015   0.020 -0.139 *** 0.011 
child03*south 0.156 *** 0.008 0.158 *** 0.010 -0.002   0.020 -0.164 *** 0.010 
child36 -0.157 *** 0.009 -0.157 *** 0.009 0.003   0.017 0.246 *** 0.013 
child36*dem 0.136 *** 0.009 0.135 *** 0.010 0.000   0.019 -0.119 *** 0.011 
child36*cont 0.075 *** 0.010 0.066 *** 0.011 -0.006   0.018 -0.081 *** 0.012 
child36*south 0.098 *** 0.009 0.110 *** 0.010 0.015   0.019 -0.143 *** 0.010 
child614 -0.117 *** 0.007 -0.114 *** 0.007 0.040 *** 0.014 0.234 *** 0.009 
child614*dem 0.134 *** 0.008 0.135 *** 0.009 -0.024 * 0.013 -0.120 *** 0.008 
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child614*cont 0.055 *** 0.008 0.052 *** 0.009 -0.021 * 0.013 -0.036 *** 0.009 
child614*south 0.070 *** 0.007 0.071 *** 0.008 -0.010   0.013 -0.139 *** 0.008 
Co-habiting Elderly                 
noelderly                 
old7080 -0.166 *** 0.019 -0.159 *** 0.019 -0.002   0.042 -0.029   0.028 
old7080*dem 0.017   0.022 0.019   0.024 0.013   0.052 0.058   0.038 
old7080*con 0.027   0.021 0.031   0.022 0.019   0.047 0.013   0.034 
old7080*south 0.122 *** 0.016 0.105 *** 0.018 0.013   0.044 0.027   0.031 
old80 -0.075 *** 0.028 -0.069 ** 0.029 -0.041   0.060 -0.057 * 0.034 
old80*dem -0.049   0.039 -0.053   0.040 0.106   0.112 0.018   0.055 
old80*cont 0.033   0.030 0.042   0.032 0.047   0.085 0.025   0.044 
old80*south 0.069 *** 0.025 0.061 ** 0.028 0.050   0.082 0.065   0.041 
Education                 
Low skilled                 
ISCED35 0.167 *** 0.007 0.186 *** 0.008 0.020   0.021 -0.051 *** 0.011 
ISCED35*dem -0.058 *** 0.010 -0.056 *** 0.010 -0.007   0.021 0.072 *** 0.014 
ISCED35*cont -0.073 *** 0.009 -0.062 *** 0.009 -0.062 *** 0.018 0.010   0.013 
ISCED35*south -0.077 *** 0.009 -0.067 *** 0.009 -0.088 *** 0.015 0.029 ** 0.012 
ISCED57 0.221 *** 0.008 0.253 *** 0.008 0.073 *** 0.022 -0.111 *** 0.011 
ISCED57*dem -0.052 *** 0.011 -0.037 *** 0.011 -0.050 *** 0.018 0.045 *** 0.014 
ISCED57*cont -0.039 *** 0.010 -0.012   0.010 -0.110 *** 0.015 -0.002   0.013 
ISCED57*south 0.009   0.009 0.002   0.010 -0.112 *** 0.013 0.067 *** 0.013 
pISCED03 0.030 *** 0.010 0.039 *** 0.011 -0.053 *** 0.019 -0.055 *** 0.013 
pISCED03*dem 0.036 *** 0.013 0.036 *** 0.013 0.054 ** 0.028 0.100 *** 0.017 
pISCED03*cont -0.032 *** 0.013 -0.006   0.013 0.057 ** 0.027 0.050 *** 0.017 
pISCED03*south -0.078 *** 0.013 -0.067 *** 0.013 0.080 *** 0.027 0.093 *** 0.016 
pISCED35 0.074 *** 0.008 0.091 *** 0.009 -0.052 *** 0.015 -0.043 *** 0.010 
pISCED35*dem 0.013   0.011 0.017   0.011 0.035 * 0.020 0.090 *** 0.013 
pISCED35*cont -0.031 *** 0.010 -0.016   0.011 0.027   0.019 0.075 *** 0.013 
pISCED35*south -0.097 *** 0.011 -0.085 *** 0.011 0.030   0.019 0.096 *** 0.013 
pISCED57 0.039 *** 0.009 0.046 *** 0.009 -0.020   0.016 -0.051 *** 0.010 
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pISCED57*dem 0.039 *** 0.011 0.052 *** 0.011 0.001   0.018 0.094 *** 0.014 
pISCED57*cont -0.025 ** 0.011 0.005   0.011 -0.002   0.017 0.130 *** 0.013 
pISCED57*south -0.045 *** 0.011 -0.021 ** 0.011 -0.014   0.016 0.084 *** 0.014 
Age             
Age25-34             
35-44 0.042 *** 0.009 0.047 *** 0.009 -0.050 *** 0.014 0.056 *** 0.011 
45-54 -0.045 *** 0.010 -0.040 *** 0.010 -0.054 *** 0.015 0.119 *** 0.011 
55-64 -0.271 *** 0.011 -0.252 *** 0.010 -0.040 ** 0.017 0.259 *** 0.012 
(35-44)*dem 0.043 *** 0.010 0.040 *** 0.011 -0.047 *** 0.014 -0.041 *** 0.012 
(45-54)*dem 0.133 *** 0.010 0.139 *** 0.011 -0.057 *** 0.015 -0.083 *** 0.012 
(55-64)*dem 0.140 *** 0.010 0.154 *** 0.011 -0.091 *** 0.013 -0.098 *** 0.012 
(35-44)*cont 0.022 ** 0.010 0.013   0.011 -0.046 *** 0.014 -0.009   0.012 
(45-54)*cont 0.059 *** 0.011 0.054 *** 0.012 -0.067 *** 0.014 -0.031 *** 0.012 
(55-64)*cont -0.016   0.012 -0.021 * 0.012 -0.091 *** 0.014 -0.092 *** 0.012 
(35-44)*south -0.018 * 0.010 0.015   0.010 -0.023   0.014 -0.036 *** 0.011 
(45-54)*south 0.001   0.011 0.059 *** 0.011 -0.073 *** 0.013 -0.097 *** 0.011 
(55-64)*south -0.052 *** 0.011 0.019 * 0.011 -0.112 *** 0.012 -0.167 *** 0.010 
Macro                 
trend 0.008 *** 0.002 0.010 *** 0.002 0.004   0.005 0.011 *** 0.002 
trend*dem 0.000   0.002 0.002   0.002 0.005   0.005 0.003   0.003 
trend*cont 0.004 * 0.002 0.005 ** 0.002 0.003   0.005 0.008 *** 0.003 
trend*south 0.002   0.002 0.001   0.002 -0.004   0.005 -0.007 *** 0.003 
cycle 0.003 *** 0.001 0.005 *** 0.001 0.003 *** 0.001 0.008 *** 0.001 
Liberal                 
Democratic -0.038   0.031 -0.110 *** 0.030 0.186 ** 0.088 -0.067 * 0.035 
Continental 0.040   0.029 -0.072 ** 0.030 0.237 *** 0.059 -0.020   0.035 
Southern 0.038   0.027 -0.063 ** 0.030 0.462 *** 0.058 0.079 ** 0.034 
Observations 818168   818168   427128   492929   
Log likelihood -432852   -473874.9   -184200.2   -293087.0   
pseudo - R2 0.148     0.127     0.091ù     0.105     
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The marital status has a larger negative impact on women’s labour market involvement in 
those countries characterized by more traditional family structure, such as found in 
continental and southern countries. The presence of young children has a negative impact on 
both participation and employment rates regardless the welfare regimes, though with some 
important differences in the magnitude of the effects. It is in the UK that the age of the latest 
child appears to be most critical, while in the southern countries, which are also the countries 
with lower employment rates for mothers, the age of the youngest child has a lower impact 
on both participation and employment. This may be simply due to differences in the 
composition of the labour force. In countries where female labour force participation is low, 
women in employment are typically characterized by a higher level of education – implying 
a stronger labour market attachment. Moreover in countries such as Italy, Greece and Spain, 
family networks compensate for the lack of availability of the service system. For example, 
extended family members, normally grandparents, often provide child care services, 
allowing the mother to continue work when their children are young due to the limited 
services provided by publicly-funded daycare facilities. Finally, labour market institutional 
rigidities in southern countries – which make (re)entering the labour market more difficult 
after a period of temporary leave – may stimulate higher continuity in work attachment. This 
difficulty in re-entering the market seems to be confirmed by the evidence that while 
mothers’ participation and employment increase steadily as the youngest child grows up 
(mostly through a re-entry to part-time employment mainly in Social Democratic countries 
but also in the UK and continental Europe), in the southern countries the presence of 
children negatively affects female labour market integration, even when the child is of school 
age. The estimates show that the probability of participating (being employed) for women’s 
with a child older than 14 in the south of Europe is almost 5 percentage points lower than in 
the UK and Social Democratic countries, and 2 percentage lower than in continental 
countries. 
The impact of an elderly relative at home on labour behaviour is found to depend on the 
cultural attitudes towards elderly relatives. In fact, while the overall effects of elder care is 
negative despite the welfare regime we consider, it is much lower in southern countries 
where co-habiting with an elderly relative is a quite diffuse practice and it is not necessarily 
related to the need of providing care to senior persons. 
Finally, the highest female participation (and employment) rate is found among those aged 
in their late 30s/early 40s in all the welfare regimes groups we consider. However the 
decline in women involvement occurs at a later stage of the life cycle in Social Democratic 
and continental countries. Moreover, the participation (employment) gap between old-aged 
women (55-64) and younger groups is significantly larger in southern countries. This is 
explained both by cultural reasons (older women are of a generation in which low female 
labour market involvement is expected as part of a male breadwinner system) and by the 
presence of early retirement pension schemes which favoured an early drop-out. In column 
(3) we report the results concerning the differences across welfare regimes of female 
temporary occupation. After controlling for individual characteristics we notice that the 
incidence of temporary contracts is much higher in Southern countries and, to a less extent, 
in continental and Social Democratic countries than in the UK. Moreover, countries in the 
south of Europe exhibit also a positive trend over the last 15 years. The most striking cross-
countries difference in the personal characteristics of women holding fixed-term positions is 
the level of education. While in the UK and Social Democratic countries women with higher 
educational qualifications are more likely to hold fixed-term contracts, this tendency is 
reversed in the southern and continental Europe. This suggests the different nature of fixed-
temporary contracts in the two groups of countries: they are more likely to be stepping 
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stones towards permanent high-skilled jobs in the former, and cheaper options, with lower 
wages and severance payments, and poor human capital accumulation in the latter. 
Regarding part-time incidence (column 4), the results show that part-time occupation is 
mainly an option for married women with kids regardless of the welfare regimes, although 
the presence of small children has a strong impact on part-time decisions in the UK rather 
than in the other countries. Once we control for the presence of children, the incidence of 
part time jobs differs across age groups with a larger share of part-timers in the older groups 
in the UK, and to a less extent in continental and Social Democratic countries. Differences 
across age groups appear to be much less marked in the southern regime where, differently 
from the other countries in the sample, the incidence of part-time jobs drops significantly for 
women in the oldest age group (55-64). 
5.2.3 Trends across welfare regimes 
In Table 8, we report the estimated coefficients of specification 4, in which we allow the 
impact of the main determinants of female labour behaviour to vary over time. Tables 9 and 
10 show the results for participation and employment using the same specification as in 
Table 3, estimated for each welfare regime separately. 
Overall, the evidence shows that the positive trends in both female employment and 
participation differ substantially depending on the personal and family characteristics of 
women. Over time, the participation/employment increases for women with small children. 
However, such increase is not uniform across welfare regimes. From the results reported in 
Tables 9 and 10, it emerges that, between 1994 and 2009, the negative impact of young 
children on women’s labour market involvement declined significantly in Social Democratic 
countries and to a lesser extent in continental and southern countries, while no trend has 
been detected for the UK. This phenomenon may be partly related to a larger availability of 
market (childcare services) or non-market substitutes (husband's or relative’s help in 
childcare activities) accompanied by a shift in people’s values in all European countries, and 
to a larger extent in more traditional countries, from the traditional breadwinner 
arrangements in favour of a more equal role for men and women within the household. This 
change in the attitude of women with children towards work has also been favoured by the 
expansion of flexible forms of employment (fixed-term contracts and part-time jobs), albeit 
from different starting points, which have allowed mothers to better combine traditional 
family responsibilities such as child-rearing with paid work. 
The negative impact of informal elderly care on employment and participation has increased 
over time (with the exception of Social Democratic countries). According to our results, the 
presence of a co-inhabitation elderly person has a positive (and significant) impact on female 
labour market involvement at the beginning of the sample period and then turns to be 
negative. This seems to be related to the changing role of elderly relatives within the family, 
from providers of unpaid help within extended family models to recipients of informal long-
term care in the nuclear family (Leitner, 2003; Saraceno, 2010, Saraceno & Naldini, 2007). 
Education (and partner's education) appears to have an increasing role in stimulating 
women’s labour market involvement. Tables 4 and 5 show that the estimated trend is 
positive in both participation and employment in Continental countries. We also estimate a 
significant increase in the share of highly educated women leaving the inactivity status in the 
UK, and leaving the unemployment status in the Southern countries. 
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Table 8. Female labour market participation and type of occupation: Trends 
             
  active employed temporary parttime 
 Coef.  Std. Err. Coef.  Std. Err. Coef.  Std. Err. Coef.  Std. Err. 
Marital status                 
Single                 
incouple -0.041 ** 0.021 -0.021   0.022 -0.005   0.020 0.060 ** 0.025 
separated 0.056 *** 0.007 0.055 *** 0.007 -0.017 *** 0.006 0.019 ** 0.009 
divorced 0.049 *** 0.004 0.029 *** 0.005 -0.014 *** 0.004 -0.016 *** 0.005 
widowed -0.067 *** 0.006 -0.032 *** 0.006 -0.011 ** 0.005 0.066 *** 0.008 
Children                 
No children                 
children -0.038 *** 0.003 -0.032 *** 0.003 0.013 *** 0.003 0.020 *** 0.004 
childd 0.052 *** 0.016 0.046 *** 0.017 0.000   0.017 -0.034   0.021 
child03d -0.160 *** 0.026 -0.120 *** 0.026 -0.050 *** 0.020 0.012   0.033 
child36d -0.133 *** 0.024 -0.126 *** 0.024 0.003   0.022 0.066 ** 0.029 
child614d -0.046 *** 0.018 -0.042 ** 0.018 0.034 ** 0.018 0.008   0.021 
trend*child -0.001   0.001 0.000   0.001 0.000   0.001 0.004 ** 0.002 
trend*child03 -0.001   0.002 -0.003   0.002 0.003   0.002 0.010 *** 0.003 
trend*child36 0.004 * 0.002 0.003   0.002 0.000   0.002 0.006 *** 0.002 
trend*child614 -0.002   0.001 -0.002   0.001 -0.001   0.001 0.012 *** 0.002 
Co-habiting Elderly                 
no elderly                 
old7080 0.063 ** 0.032 0.031   0.035 0.035   0.035 -0.083 * 0.048 
old80 -0.082 * 0.043 -0.062   0.044 0.121 ** 0.052 -0.023   0.061 
trend*old7080 -0.010 *** 0.003 -0.008 *** 0.003 -0.002   0.003 0.008 * 0.004 
trend*old80 0.004   0.003 0.004   0.003 -0.009 *** 0.003 0.002   0.005 
Education                 
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Low skilled                 
ISCED35 0.086 *** 0.016 0.074 *** 0.017 -0.079 *** 0.016 -0.033   0.023 
ISCED57 0.152 *** 0.019 0.129 *** 0.021 -0.053 *** 0.017 0.003   0.025 
trend*ISCED35 0.003 ** 0.001 0.006 *** 0.001 0.001   0.001 -0.001   0.002 
trend*ISCED57 0.005 *** 0.002 0.010 *** 0.002 -0.001   0.001 -0.009 *** 0.002 
pISCED03 -0.056 ** 0.025 -0.036   0.025 0.041 * 0.024 -0.063 ** 0.030 
pISCED35 -0.058 ** 0.024 -0.043 * 0.024 -0.002   0.023 0.008   0.029 
pISCED57 -0.064 *** 0.026 -0.029   0.026 0.039   0.027 0.028   0.030 
trend*pISCED03 0.003 * 0.002 0.003 * 0.002 -0.002   0.002 0.004   0.002 
trend*pISCED35 0.008 *** 0.002 0.009 *** 0.002 -0.002   0.002 0.000   0.002 
trend*pISCED57 0.006 *** 0.002 0.006 *** 0.002 -0.006 *** 0.002 -0.001   0.002 
Age                 
25-34                 
35-44 -0.042 ** 0.021 0.006   0.022 -0.093 *** 0.016 0.026   0.025 
45-54 -0.157 *** 0.023 -0.085 *** 0.023 -0.170 *** 0.015 -0.010   0.028 
55-64 -0.455 *** 0.020 -0.383 *** 0.021 -0.128 *** 0.016 0.087 *** 0.033 
trend*(35-44) 0.008 *** 0.002 0.005 *** 0.002 0.002   0.001 0.000   0.002 
trend*(45-54) 0.012 *** 0.002 0.008 *** 0.002 0.006 *** 0.002 0.005 ** 0.002 
trend*(55-64) 0.013 *** 0.002 0.011 *** 0.002 0.000   0.002 0.004   0.003 
Macro                 
trend 0.000   0.002 0.001   0.002 0.003 ** 0.002 -0.004   0.002 
cycle 0.003 *** 0.001 0.005 *** 0.001 0.002 *** 0.001 0.005 *** 0.001 
Observations 818168   818168   427128   492929   
Log likelihood -432641.4   -473009.5   -125878.3   -282816.9   
pseudo - R2 0.148     0.128     0.087     0.129     
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Table 9. Female  activity rate: Trends and welfare regimes 
Active ALL LIBERAL CONTINENTAL DEMOCRATIC SOUTHERN 
 Coef.  Std. Err. Coef.  Std. Err. Coef.  Std. Err. Coef.  Std. Err. Coef.  Std. Err. 
Marital status                     
Single                     
incouple -0.041 ** 0.021 -0.034   0.073 -0.060 * 0.035 0.023   0.031 -0.029   0.032 
separated 0.056 *** 0.007 0.022   0.017 0.055 *** 0.017 -0.003   0.023 0.088 *** 0.009 
divorced 0.049 *** 0.004 0.036 *** 0.013 0.033 *** 0.007 -0.012 * 0.007 0.111 *** 0.008 
widowed -0.067 *** 0.006 0.016   0.013 -0.094 *** 0.010 -0.021 * 0.012 -0.090 *** 0.007 
Children                     
No children                     
children -0.038 *** 0.003 -0.026 ** 0.012 -0.036 *** 0.005 -0.035 *** 0.006 -0.032 *** 0.004 
childd 0.052 *** 0.016 0.047   0.067 0.133 *** 0.027 0.122 *** 0.026 0.002   0.022 
child03d -0.160 *** 0.026 -0.272 *** 0.092 -0.263 *** 0.044 -0.354 *** 0.053 -0.064 * 0.034 
child36d -0.133 *** 0.024 -0.209 ** 0.090 -0.201 *** 0.042 0.027   0.037 -0.110 *** 0.031 
child614d -0.046 *** 0.018 -0.118 * 0.069 -0.047   0.032 0.003   0.033 -0.069 *** 0.023 
trend*child -0.001   0.001 0.001   0.005 -0.006 *** 0.002 -0.004 * 0.002 0.002   0.002 
trend*child03 -0.001   0.002 0.001   0.007 0.003   0.003 0.011 *** 0.003 0.000   0.003 
trend*child36 0.004 * 0.002 0.003   0.007 0.009 *** 0.003 -0.002   0.003 0.005 * 0.002 
trend*child614 -0.002   0.001 0.000   0.005 -0.001   0.003 0.002   0.003 0.001   0.002 
Co-habiting Elderly                     
no elderly                     
old7080 0.063 ** 0.032 -0.174   0.179 0.051   0.078 -0.151   0.110 0.059 * 0.035 
old80 -0.082 * 0.043 -0.025   0.248 -0.166   0.119 -0.007   0.155 -0.064   0.046 
trend*old7080 -0.010 *** 0.003 0.000   0.013 -0.014 ** 0.007 0.000   0.007 -0.007 ** 0.003 
trend*old80 0.004   0.003 -0.004   0.019 0.010   0.009 -0.007   0.012 0.004   0.004 
Education                     
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Low skilled                     
ISCED35 0.086 *** 0.016 0.128 * 0.067 0.016   0.031 0.082 *** 0.031 0.112 *** 0.021 
ISCED57 0.152 *** 0.019 0.106   0.074 0.045   0.036 0.108 *** 0.033 0.252 *** 0.025 
trend*ISCED35 0.003 ** 0.001 0.004   0.006 0.006 *** 0.002 0.001   0.003 0.001   0.002 
trend*ISCED57 0.005 *** 0.002 0.010 * 0.006 0.011 *** 0.003 0.003   0.003 0.000   0.002 
pISCED03 -0.056 ** 0.025 -0.009   0.099 0.019   0.045 0.000   0.044 -0.073 ** 0.033 
pISCED35 -0.058 ** 0.024 0.065   0.076 0.001   0.039 -0.015   0.039 -0.106 *** 0.035 
pISCED57 -0.064 *** 0.026 0.028   0.080 -0.059   0.042 -0.026   0.043 -0.018   0.039 
trend*pISCED03 0.003 * 0.002 0.003   0.008 -0.001   0.004 0.004   0.004 0.003   0.003 
trend*pISCED35 0.008 *** 0.002 0.001   0.006 0.003   0.003 0.007 ** 0.003 0.010 *** 0.003 
trend*pISCED57 0.006 *** 0.002 0.001   0.006 0.006 ** 0.003 0.007 ** 0.003 0.002   0.003 
Age                     
25-34                     
35-44 -0.042 ** 0.021 0.101   0.077 -0.107 *** 0.039 0.093 *** 0.035 -0.039   0.027 
45-54 -0.157 *** 0.023 -0.119   0.091 -0.239 *** 0.037 0.107 *** 0.038 -0.139 *** 0.029 
55-64 -0.455 *** 0.020 -0.281 *** 0.094 -0.585 *** 0.025 0.005   0.040 -0.387 *** 0.029 
trend*(35-44) 0.008 *** 0.002 -0.005   0.006 0.014 *** 0.003 -0.002   0.003 0.006 *** 0.002 
trend*(45-54) 0.012 *** 0.002 0.005   0.007 0.021 *** 0.003 -0.002   0.003 0.008 *** 0.002 
trend*(55-64) 0.013 *** 0.002 0.000   0.007 0.027 *** 0.003 -0.006 * 0.003 0.005 ** 0.002 
Macro                     
trend 0.000   0.002 0.000   0.008 -0.003   0.004 0.002   0.004 0.002   0.002 
cycle 0.003 *** 0.001 0.000   0.002 0.007 *** 0.001 0.000   0.001 -0.001   0.001 
Observations 818168  50464  328750  129536  309418  
Log likelihood -432641.4  26576.7  -165905.6  -60043.2  -169651.0  
pseudo - R2 0.148   0.123   0.143   0.086   0.175   
Country dummies yes     -     yes     yes     yes     
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Table 10. Female  activity rate: Trends and welfare regimes 
Employed ALL LIBERAL CONTINENTAL DEMOCRATIC SOUTHERN 
 Coef.  Std. Er. Coef.  Std. Er. Coef.  Std. Er. Coef.  Std. Er. Coef.  Std. Er. 
Marital status                
Single                
incouple -0.021  0.022 0.029  0.074 -0.065 * 0.035 0.033  0.034 0.008  0.033 
separated 0.055 *** 0.007 0.033 * 0.017 0.021  0.018 0.012  0.024 0.091 *** 0.009 
divorced 0.029 *** 0.005 0.039 *** 0.013 0.006  0.007 -0.020 *** 0.007 0.114 *** 0.008 
widowed -0.032 *** 0.006 0.022 * 0.013 -0.049 *** 0.010 -0.009  0.013 -0.045 *** 0.008 
Children                
No children                
children -0.032 *** 0.003 -0.019  0.012 -0.026 *** 0.006 -0.038 *** 0.006 -0.031 *** 0.004 
childd 0.046 *** 0.017 -0.001  0.068 0.085 *** 0.030 0.146 *** 0.028 0.026  0.023 
child03d -0.120 *** 0.026 -0.313 *** 0.086 -0.186 *** 0.044 -0.381 *** 0.049 -0.038  0.034 
child36d -0.126 *** 0.024 -0.245 *** 0.087 -0.181 *** 0.041 0.001  0.042 -0.104 *** 0.031 
child614d -0.042 ** 0.018 -0.121 * 0.068 -0.040  0.033 -0.017  0.036 -0.058 ** 0.024 
trend*child 0.000  0.001 0.004  0.005 -0.002  0.002 -0.005 ** 0.002 0.000  0.002 
trend*child03 -0.003  0.002 0.006  0.007 -0.002  0.004 0.015 *** 0.003 -0.002  0.003 
trend*child36 0.003  0.002 0.006  0.007 0.007 ** 0.003 -0.001  0.003 0.005 * 0.003 
trend*child614 -0.002  0.001 0.000  0.005 -0.002  0.003 0.003  0.003 0.000  0.002 
Co-habiting Elderly                
no elderly                
old7080 0.031  0.035 -0.184  0.175 0.015  0.087 -0.100  0.111 0.028  0.039 
old80 -0.062  0.044 -0.015  0.246 -0.083  0.119 -0.062  0.191 -0.067  0.046 
trend*old7080 -0.008 *** 0.003 0.002  0.013 -0.011  0.007 -0.003  0.008 -0.006 ** 0.003 
trend*old80 0.004  0.003 -0.004  0.019 0.005  0.009 -0.003  0.014 0.005  0.004 
Education                
Low skilled                
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ISCED35 0.074 *** 0.017 0.171 *** 0.065 -0.018  0.032 0.116 *** 0.033 0.124 *** 0.023 
ISCED57 0.129 *** 0.021 0.156 ** 0.073 -0.002  0.038 0.154 *** 0.036 0.223 *** 0.027 
trend*ISCED35 0.006 *** 0.001 0.001  0.006 0.012 *** 0.003 0.000  0.003 0.002  0.002 
trend*ISCED57 0.010 *** 0.002 0.007  0.006 0.019 *** 0.003 0.002  0.003 0.004 ** 0.002 
pISCED03 -0.036  0.025 0.011  0.097 0.022  0.047 0.005  0.046 -0.065 * 0.035 
pISCED35 -0.043 * 0.024 0.039  0.077 0.014  0.039 -0.010  0.041 -0.093 *** 0.036 
pISCED57 -0.029  0.026 0.031  0.080 -0.024  0.042 -0.020  0.045 0.004  0.041 
trend*pISCED03 0.003 * 0.002 0.002  0.008 0.000  0.004 0.005  0.004 0.004 * 0.003 
trend*pISCED35 0.009 *** 0.002 0.004  0.006 0.004  0.003 0.008 *** 0.003 0.011 *** 0.003 
trend*pISCED57 0.006 *** 0.002 0.001  0.006 0.006 * 0.003 0.008 ** 0.004 0.003  0.003 
Age                
25-34                
35-44 0.006  0.022 0.084  0.079 -0.061  0.039 0.125 *** 0.037 0.017  0.028 
45-54 -0.085 *** 0.023 -0.129  0.090 -0.177 *** 0.039 0.125 *** 0.041 -0.050 * 0.031 
55-64 -0.383 *** 0.021 -0.312 *** 0.089 -0.529 *** 0.025 0.010  0.043 -0.291 *** 0.029 
trend*(35-44) 0.005 *** 0.002 -0.003  0.006 0.010 *** 0.003 -0.004  0.003 0.004 * 0.002 
trend*(45-54) 0.008 *** 0.002 0.006  0.007 0.016 *** 0.003 -0.002  0.004 0.005 ** 0.002 
trend*(55-64) 0.011 *** 0.002 0.004  0.007 0.025 *** 0.003 -0.006 * 0.003 0.005 * 0.003 
Macro                
trend 0.001  0.002 0.000  0.007 -0.006  0.004 0.006  0.004 0.005 ** 0.002 
cycle 0.005 *** 0.001 0.002  0.002 0.007 *** 0.001 0.001 ** 0.001 0.004 *** 0.001 
Observations 818168  50464  328750  129536  309418  
Log likelihood 
-
473009.5  -27444.5  -186695.4  -67324.4  
-
185333.1  
pseudo - R2 0.128   0.117   0.122   0.084   0.132   
Country dummies yes   -   yes   yes   yes   
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Finally, the trend effect also differs substantially across age groups and across welfare 
regimes. While in the UK, the trend effect is quite homogenous across women in different 
age groups, in continental and southern countries, the increase in participation and 
employment is more evident for older age groups and this is partly explained by cohort 
effects. In fact, while there is not a substantial difference in the labour market behaviour of 
women in their mid-20s and 30s (having been born after the early 1960s and grpwn up and 
educated after the women’s movement in the 1970s), for those in their mid-30s and 40s, the 
participation rate has increased by 11 percentage points, and for those older than 45 by 
almost 20 percentage points. 
Regarding the trend in part-time occupations (Table 8, column 4), the most interesting result 
is the increasing involvement in part-time jobs of women with children, and this trend is 
much stronger for women with children younger than 14. This result is in line with the 
existence of a relationship between the observed increase in the labour market activity of 
women with children over the sample period and the increasing availability of part-time 
jobs. Moreover, since the trend effect on part-time mothers’ occupations is much stronger 
than the estimated trends on mother’s participation/employment, the result suggests a shift 
from full-time positions to part-time positions of women with children who were already in 
employment. 
6. Multi-level analysis 
In this section we investigate the relevance of the labour market institutional framework and 
family policies in explaining the trends and cross-country differences in woman labour 
market involvement that we pointed out in the previous section. We will refer to the variable 
of institutional context and policies as ‘macro’ factors. In the analysis we will allow the 
interactions between micro- (individual characteristics) and macro-factors in order to detect 
any possible indirect effect of institutions and policies on employment and participation 
through the impact of micro determinants. The intuition is straightforward: both macro-
factors and individual characteristics may be systematically related to the probability of 
being active/employed. However, an indirect impact may be in place when macro-factors 
affect also the way micro-characteristics impact women’s behaviour. In order to 
simultaneously estimate the impact of micro- and macro-factors within a unified regression 
model, we use a multi-level analysis approach. This method allows us to consider a wider set 
of determinants of women’s employment than is possible with a standard regression 
approach and to disentangle the direct and indirect effect of both micro- and macro-
determinants (e.g. to estimate the simultaneous role of family care responsibilities, such as 
childcare and elderly care and family policy in determining female participation).7 
In our multi-level analysis we focus on how institutional and policy factors affect women’s 
behaviour between unpaid family responsibility and paid occupation. There is a large 
consensus on the role played by institutions and policies in affecting women’s labour market 
behaviour and work attachment. The empirical analysis in the previous section shows that 
the impact of household-related responsibilities on woman labour market behaviour exhibits 
a country-specific patterns,8 and recent empirical works provide evidence that the provision 
                                                   
7 In contrast to the standard difference-in-difference approach, which uses interaction terms between 
micro- and macro-level variables, the multi-level method allows us to control for the fact that 
observations may be clustered by country and therefore, standard error estimates are more reliable. 
8 Our results are in line with the findings in several related papers (see among others Bardasi & 
Gornick, 2003; Jaumotte, 2003; Del Boca et al., 2009). 
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of childcare facilities, parental leave and subsidies for day care spaces and, more generally, 
policies aimed to alleviating the financial burden of child-rearing, have a positive effect on 
female labour integration by either increasing work attachment (less women leaving 
occupation after childbirth) or facilitating women’s re-entry into the labour market as 
children grow up (Sànchez-Mangas & Sànchez-Marcos, 2008; Lefebvre et al., 2009). Next to 
fiscal and social policies for the support of working mothers, the role played by changes in 
the institutional context is gaining increasing attention in the political debate. In the last two 
decades, the labour markets in many European countries have experienced deep changes 
towards the promotion of a so-called ‘flexicurity’ model of labour market with the aim of 
increasing competitiveness, employment creation and redistribution of work. Although the 
idea of deregulation was the common factor behind the waves of reform, the promotion of 
flexicurity was pursued through very different types of intervention on the flexibility and 
security side. In the Social Democratic countries, reforms were mainly aimed to reduce the 
protection ofn insiders by reducing the degree of employment protection on regular forms of 
employment on the one hand, and increasing income security on the other.9 
In the southern countries and some continental countries, flexibility has been obtained 
through marginal reforms aimed at deregulating the use of temporary or ‘atypical’ forms of 
employment while leaving largely unchanged the legislation applying to the stock of 
workers employed under permanent (open-end) contracts. In other countries, as for example 
in the Netherlands, the emphasis of the reforms was to promote flexible working time and 
part-time arrangements. Such reforms can be regarded as beneficial to women to the extent 
they facilitate labour market integration. However, this integration may occur at the risk of a 
reinforcement of the traditional separation of gender roles in the labour market and within 
the family. 
From the flexibility side, the link between labour market deregulation and women’s 
participation is not clear-cut, although there are a number of empirical studies showing how 
the effects of strict employment protection legislation (EPL) are disproportionately larger for 
those individuals (such as prime-age women) who are more subject to labour market entry 
problems. As a result, in a rigid labour market, employment opportunities for prime-age 
women are significantly reduced because they are more likely than men to move between 
employment and inactivity, in particular when seeking to balance the competing demands of 
work and family life (OECD, 2004; Heckman & Pages, 2000). From the security side, whether 
the presence of a generous unemployment benefit system accompanied by active (and 
activation) policies increases incentives to work largely depends on the eligibility 
requirements. In many countries the access to social security and to active labour policies are 
interdependent and depends on the past work history of workers (for example, contribution 
records showing recent and continuous employment). These requirements may represent a 
barrier for women who may have interrupted careers and work part-time. This implies that, 
while on the one hand, the burden of flexibility is increasingly borne by women, on the other 
women are more likely to be excluded from the access to benefits and active policies. So if 
women are in principle supposed to benefit from the combination of flexibility in the labour 
market and security in the social system, the tendency towards greter flexibility of the labour 
market may exert a negative impact on the incentives to participate when flexible 
occupations are perceived to be of lower quality and poorly securitized. 
Based on the results obtained in the previous section and on the findings of the related 
literature, we test two main hypotheses: 
                                                   
9 This is the so-called Danish model of ‘flexicurity’. 
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H₁: In countries with more progressive social policies in terms of support to families with 
young children (including the maternity, parental and childcare leave) and dependent 
elderly persons, housework and family-related responsibilities have a weaker impact on 
women’s involvement in the labour market. 
H₂: Changes in the institutional setting towards a model characterized by lower barriers to 
hiring and firing combined with a higher social protection (passive labour market policies 
and active labour market policies) have a positive impact on female labour market 
activity/employment of women and the impact is larger for women who are more involved 
in family (unpaid) occupations. 
6.1 The macro-policy and institutional indicators 
We collect several variables related to the country-specific socioeconomic context that are 
expected to affect the influence of housework and family-related responsibilities on women's 
attachment to local labour markets. We distinguish six relevant dimensions of cross-country 
heterogeneity: the extent of employment protection legislation, passive and active labour 
market policies, subsidies targeted to elderly people, subsidies targeted to families, and the 
extent of parental leave. Table 11 presents a detailed description of these dimensions, by 
focusing on their construction and their specific components. 
 In order to obtain uncorrelated synthetic indicators from the six macro-variables, we employ 
a principal-component analysis (PCA) separately on the institutions-related dimensions and 
on the policies-related dimensions to extract the relevant factors, which are then rotated 
using the varimax method. In keeping with common practice (Nardo et al., 2005, Nicoletti et 
al., 1999, Kline, 1994), two factors satisfying the following requirements have been selected: 
eigenvalues larger than 1, individual contribution to the explanation of the overall variance 
larger than 10%. Within each factor, dimensions are weighted according to the proportion of 
the cross-countries’ variance explained by the factor itself. 
The results of the two PCA procedures are presented in Table 12. Each factor explains 50% of 
the underlying variance. The first factor (henceforth called POL) is highly correlated with 
parental leave and family subsidies (with factor loadings larger than 0.8) and moderately 
correlated with the extent of subsidies to the elderly (factor loading approximately equal to 
0.26). The higher the load the more relevant in defining the factor's dimensionality. Hence 
our first factor reasonably represents the generosity of national welfare regimes to 
households with dependent children. 
The second factor (henceforth called INST) is defined by active and passive labour market 
policies (with factor loadings larger than 0.9), while the extent of employment protection 
legislation exerts an inverse impact on the factor (with negative factor loading, -0.15). Hence, 
this factor resumes the degree of flexicurity of national labour market institutions. The 
similarity between the standard definition of flexicurity and our second factor is 
straightforward. Indeed, the European Commission defines flexicurity as an integrated 
strategy to simultaneously enhance flexibility and security in the labour market. It is 
traditionally implemented across three main components: 1) flexible and reliable contractual 
arrangements, which are negatively correlated with employment protection; 2) effective 
active labour market policies and 3) modern social security systems providing adequate 
income support during employment transitions, which are positively correlated with passive 
labour-market policies. 
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Table 11. Description of macro-policy and institutional indicators 
Final 
variable 
Original 
variable Description Source 
Institutions 
Employment 
protection 
legislation 
Synthetic index of employment protection which refers 
both to regulations concerning hiring (e.g. rules 
favouring disadvantaged groups, conditions for using 
temporary or fixed-term contracts, training requirements) 
and firing (e.g. redundancy procedures, mandated 
prenotification periods and severance payments, special 
requirements for collective dismissals and short-time 
work schemes). 
OECD, 
various 
years 
Passive 
labour 
market 
policies 
Sum of national expenditures on active labour market 
policies (in percentage of national GDP), including: Out-
of-work income maintenance and support, Early 
retirement. 
OECD, 
various 
years 
Active labour 
market 
policies 
Sum of national expenditures on active labour market 
policies (in percentage of national GDP), including: 
Training, Job Rotation and Job Sharing, Employment 
incentives, Supported employment and rehabilitation, 
Direct job creation, Start-up incentives.  
OECD, 
various 
years 
Policies 
Elderly 
subsidies 
Sum of national transfers to the elderly population (per 
head at constant prices (2000) and constant PPPs (2000), 
in US dollars), weighted by the percentage of old-age 
population (over 70 years old) within the country. This 
set of policies includes: Old age cash and in kind benefits, 
Residential care or Home-help services. 
OECD, 
various 
years 
Family 
Subidies 
Sum of national expenditures on allowances and other 
type of monthly transfers to the households (per family at 
constant prices (2000) and constant PPPs(2000), in US 
dollars). We consider a weighted sum of monthly family 
allowances for the first, second, and third child in 
national currency, with weights equal to the average 
number of children a woman would have if she lived to 
the end of her childbearing years (conventionally 
considered to be 15-44 but sometimes 15-49) and bore 
children at the prevailing rate for each age during that 
period. Value of tax and benefit transfers of one-earner-
two-parent two-child families are considered. The value 
was calculated by subtracting the disposable income 
(after taxes and transfers) of a one-earner-two-parent-
two-child family from that of a comparable childless 
single earner.  
Gauthier 
(2011a and 
2011b) 
Paternal 
leave 
Synthetic indicator of national expenditures on 
maternity, parental, and child care leave schemes. It is a 
weighted sum of the total number of weeks of maternity, 
parental and child-care leave, with weights equal to the 
cash benefits paid during the leave as a percent of female 
wages in manufacturing. 
Gauthier 
(2011b) 
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Table 12. Principal component analysis: Rotated factor loadings 
Variable Factor1 Factor2 Uniqueness 
Elderly subsidies 0.2570  0.9339 
Parental leave 0.8251  0.3192 
Family subsidies 0.8399  0.2946 
Employment protection legislation  -0.1499 0.9775 
Passive labour market policies  0.9119 0.1684 
Active labour market policies  0.9215 0.1509 
6.2 The empirical specification and results 
6.2.1 The role of policy and institutions 
Our econometric specification consists of a multi-level analysis based on our (simplified) 
baseline probit model <ref>M1n</ref>. We then allow both the intercept and the impacts of 
some individual characteristics (namely having small children and co-residing with an old-
aged dependent) to depend on two country-specific (but time variant) macroeconomic 
factors: INST (labour-market institutional context) and POL (family-oriented policies). 
Our random coefficient model is composed of an individual first-level regression, estimated 
for each age group separately, of the following type: 
  ijtkijtkijtjtijtjtjtijt xELDERLYCHILDy  210     (5) 
and a second level set of regressions as follows: 
 
jtjtjtjt
jtjtjtjt
jtjtjtjt
uPOLINST
uPOLINST
uPOLINST
22221202
11211101
00201000






 
 
We implement Generalized Linear Latent Models to estimate a two-level Random-Intercept 
Probit model and a two-level Random-Coefficient Probit model, taking into account the 
nesting of individuals in their country of origin.10  
In contrast to the analysis carried out in section 5, we now focus on women in the prime age 
group (25-54) because family care burdens, such as childcare and elderly care, are less 
relevant. The model is estimated for the whole sample (pooled model) and then for each age 
group separately. We also test whether and to what extent changes in family policies and 
labour-market institutions affect the labour-market decisions of women with different levels 
of education and estimate (5) for the three education groups (primary, secondary and tertiary 
education). 
                                                   
10 Cipollone & D’Ippoliti (2011) carried out a similar analysis for Italy, exploiting territorial 
heterogeneity at regional level. 
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The results are reported in Tables 13 and 14 for the activity rate and participation rate 
respectively. 
 
Table 13. Two-level probit regression: Activity rate by age groups 
Active ALL 25-34 34-45 44-55 
 Coef  
Std. 
Err Coef  
Std. 
Err Coef  
Std. 
Err Coef  
Std. 
Err 
                 
ISCED35 0.131 *** 0.001 0.082 *** 0.003 0.136 *** 0.002 0.143 *** 0.002 
ISCED57 0.213 *** 0.002 0.154 *** 0.003 0.219 *** 0.003 0.235 *** 0.003 
incouple -0.045 *** 0.002 -0.033 *** 0.003 -0.069 *** 0.003 -0.069 *** 0.004 
separated 0.059 *** 0.004 0.070 *** 0.008 0.034 *** 0.006 0.038 *** 0.007 
divorced 0.044 *** 0.003 0.071 *** 0.006 0.010 *** 0.004 0.007   0.004 
widowed -0.056 *** 0.004 -0.038 ** 0.018 -0.069 *** 0.008 -0.079 *** 0.006 
children -0.030 *** 0.001 -0.064 *** 0.002 -0.028 *** 0.001 -0.017 *** 0.001 
child06 -0.118 *** 0.001 -0.137 *** 0.002 -0.104 *** 0.002 -0.078 *** 0.006 
old70 -0.020 *** 0.003 -0.011 * 0.007 -0.019 *** 0.005 -0.027 *** 0.005 
pISCED03 -0.038 *** 0.002 0.008 ** 0.003 -0.046 *** 0.003 -0.047 *** 0.004 
pISCED35 0.004 * 0.002 0.053 *** 0.003 -0.013 *** 0.003 -0.012 *** 0.004 
pISCED57 -0.008 *** 0.002 0.042 *** 0.003 -0.028 *** 0.003 -0.025 *** 0.004 
cycle 0.001 ** 0.000 -0.001   0.001 0.001   0.001 0.002 *** 0.001 
trend -0.002  0.000 -0.009  0.000 -0.003  0.000 0.005  0.000 
democratic 0.037  0.123 0.263  0.179 0.058  0.126 -0.129  0.092 
continental -0.041  0.115 0.251  0.169 -0.008  0.118 -0.264  0.085 
southern -0.056  0.119 0.267  0.174 0.005  0.122 -0.303  0.086 
inst -0.006   0.014 -0.061 * 0.037 0.008   0.015 0.024   0.015 
pol 0.003   0.024 -0.009   0.045 0.013   0.026 0.006   0.020 
inst*child06 0.015 *** 0.001 0.040 *** 0.002 0.002   0.002 0.008   0.006 
pol*child06 0.000   0.001 0.006 *** 0.002 0.003   0.002 0.008   0.006 
inst*old70 -0.020 *** 0.003 -0.013 ** 0.006 -0.019 *** 0.005 -0.023 *** 0.005 
pol*old70 -0.008 ** 0.003 -0.008   0.007 0.004   0.006 -0.026 *** 0.005 
age35-44 0.020 *** 0.020             
age45-54 -0.030 *** -0.030             
VPC_overall 0.056     0.199     0.063     0.042     
VPC_level 2 0.426     0.675     0.439     0.439     
 
The influence of individual-level variables on female labour-market decisions is in line with 
the results in the previous section. Both the POL and INST indicators exert a significant 
impact on likelihood of the women being employed and being active, although the effect is 
mediated by the type of unpaid work involved (presence of child or/and elderly person) and 
differs substantially across age groups. Regarding the role of family policies, the availability 
of child subsidies and child-friendly policies has a positive impact on the activity rate, 
although the effect appears to be significant only for relatively young women (25-34) at the 
early stage of their work life. Measures to help women combine caring responsibilities 
appear also to have a positive and significant effect on the employment opportunities of 
women’s co-habitating with an elderly person. The effect reverses in the later stages of work 
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life, when the presence of family subsidies reduces the incentives to remain in the labour 
force for those women living with an elderly person. 
More flexibility combined with more security (represented by INST indicator in the 
regression) is employment-enhancing for young women with small children, but the effect 
disappears for women in the older age groups. Quite surprisingly, higher labour flexibility is 
detrimental for the labour market involvement of women co-habitating with an elderly 
person. This result may be related to the fact that just a few countries in Europe have 
combined the two dimensions of flexibility and security,11 and, in most cases, deregulation is 
moving forward without sufficient social compensation. In this respect, the growing 
availability of flexible low-paid jobs, which very often represent a forced alternative rather 
than an option to more stable forms of employment, make unpaid elderly caring more 
attractive than paid occupations, especially in countries where family-caring activities are 
supported by monetary allowances that can be freely used to complement the family 
budget.12 
Tables 15 and 16 present the impact of the macro-factors estimated for the three education 
groups separately. The results confirm substantially those reported in s 13 and 14. 
Interestingly, the impact of family-care burdens on women participation/employment 
declines with the level of education. Indeed, highly educated women show a higher 
propensity to be involved in paid work even in presence of family care responsibilities. 
Family policies provide a set of incentives/opportunities to remain in the labour market for 
medium- and highly educated women with children, but the effect is negative for low-skilled 
women, whose employment opportunities are limited both in terms of quality of jobs 
available and wages. Similarly, larger family subsidies have a negative impact on the labour-
market participation of low-educated women who are involved in elderly care. The effect 
turns to be positive for medium-educated women and not significant for highly educated 
women. These results show how women's choices between paid work and unpaid care and 
the effects of policies crucially depend on the outside family options and their potential 
labour-market outcome. In general, cash benefits increase household income and raise the 
reservation wage at which women are available for work. Therefore, more generous 
supports for child- and elderly-related costs discourage labour market participation those in 
charge of family care, typically women, when the labour market opportunities are poor. 
Consistent with the results found in the previous set of estimations, the INST indicator is 
positively related to the likelihood of participating and being employed regardless of the 
level of education of the mother, implying that a larger availability of flexicure employment 
systems increases the likelihood of entry (or re-entry) into the labour market for women with 
young children. However, the negative effect of elderly care on participation and 
employment is larger in a more deregulated labour market. Such effect holds for low-
medium educated women (whose work propensity is lower and work opportunities are in 
general poorer) but not for highly educated women whose labour market opportunities are 
less vulnerable to institutional changes. 
  
                                                   
11 Combining the two axes of flexibility and security, Tangian (2007) concludes that only Denmark and 
the Netherlands are developing both dimensions. 
12 See Simonazzi (2009) for a detailed analysis of the recent dynamics of the care sector in the EU 
countries. 
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Table 15. Two-level probit regression: Activity rate by education groups 
Active ISCED_03 ISCED_35 ISCED_57 
variable Coef  Std. Err Coef  Std. Err Coef  Std. Err 
             
incouple -0.08 *** 0.004 -0.05 *** 0.003 -0.04 *** 0.002 
separated 0.056 *** 0.007 0.061 *** 0.007 0.019 *** 0.007 
divorced 0.034 *** 0.005 0.045 *** 0.004 0.013 *** 0.004 
widowed -0.08 *** 0.007 -0.05 *** 0.007 -0.03 *** 0.008 
children -0.03 *** 0.001 -0.03 *** 0.001 -0.01 *** 0.001 
child06 -0.13 *** 0.003 -0.12 *** 0.002 -0.11 *** 0.002 
old70 -0.04 *** 0.006 -0.02 *** 0.006 -0.02 *** 0.006 
pISCED03 -0.05 *** 0.004 -0.01 ** 0.003 0.001   0.004 
pISCED35 -0.02 *** 0.004 0.01 *** 0.003 0.026 *** 0.003 
pISCED57 -0.03 *** 0.006 -0.02 *** 0.003 0.014 *** 0.003 
age35-44 -0.03 *** 0.003 0.031 *** 0.002 0.041 *** 0.002 
age45-54 -0.11 *** 0.003 -0.01 *** 0.003 0.024 *** 0.002 
inst 0.004   0.028 -0.02   0.013 -0.05 *** 0.014 
pol -0.02   0.041 -0   0.024 -0.01   0.020 
cycle 0.002 ** 0.001 0.002 *** 0.001 0.001 ** 0.001 
democratic 0.091  0.142 0.163  0.142 0.194  0.117 
continental -0.08  0.132 0.054  0.135 0.16  0.111 
southern -0.03  0.136 0.024  0.138 0.132  0.114 
trend -0  0.001 -0  0.000 -0  0.000 
inst*child06 0.012 *** 0.003 0.014 *** 0.002 0.025 *** 0.002 
pol*child06 0.001   0.002 0.004 ** 0.002 0.011 *** 0.002 
inst*old70 -0.04 *** 0.006 -0.02 *** 0.006 -0   0.006 
pol*old70 -0.02 *** 0.006 -0   0.006 0.002   0.006 
VPC_overall 0.121     0.048     0.058     
VPC_level 2 0.572     0.419     0.453     
 
The variance partition coefficient (VPC) of the pooled model is approximately equal to 0.06, 
which indicates that 6% of the variance in employment and participation rates can be 
attributed to differences between countries. This coefficient globally increases when the 
models are separately estimated by age group and educational level. In particular, it seems 
that macroeconomic heterogeneities are particularly relevant in explaining cross-country 
differences in employment and participation rates of younger and less skilled women (VPC 
increases up to 20% and 11% respectively), while individual heterogeneity accounts for more 
than 95% of those differences for women between 45 and 55 years of age. Our macro-factors 
are able to explain almost 50% of the overall cross-country variance, as shown by the level-2 
variance partition coefficients of our employment and participation rate estimates. 
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Table 16. Two-level probit regression: Employment rate by education groups 
Active ISCED_03  ISCED_35  ISCED_57  
variable Coef  Std. Err Coef  Std. Err Coef  Std. Err 
          
incouple -0.043 *** 0.004 -0.035 *** 0.003 -0.032 *** 0.003 
separated 0.048 *** 0.008 0.052 *** 0.008 0.032 *** 0.008 
divorced 0.023 *** 0.006 0.030 *** 0.004 0.009 ** 0.004 
widowed -0.027 *** 0.007 -0.030 *** 0.008 -0.015 * 0.009 
children -0.031 *** 0.001 -0.028 *** 0.001 -0.011 *** 0.001 
child06 -0.139 *** 0.003 -0.129 *** 0.003 -0.108 *** 0.002 
old70 -0.022 *** 0.007 -0.021 *** 0.006 -0.037 *** 0.006 
pISCED03 -0.013 *** 0.004 0.023 *** 0.004 0.022 *** 0.004 
pISCED35 0.027 *** 0.005 0.049 *** 0.003 0.055 *** 0.003 
pISCED57 0.022 *** 0.006 0.027 *** 0.004 0.048 *** 0.003 
age35-44 0.003   0.003 0.046 *** 0.003 0.062 *** 0.002 
age45-54 -0.056 *** 0.003 0.015 *** 0.003 0.051 *** 0.003 
inst -0.018   0.028 -0.044 ** 0.018 -0.063 *** 0.015 
pol -0.037   0.041 -0.005   0.030 -0.002   0.027 
cycle 0.003 *** 0.001 0.002 *** 0.001 0.001 ** 0.001 
democratic 0.078  0.139 0.128  0.172 0.236  0.134 
continental -0.121  0.129 0.004  0.165 0.141  0.128 
southern -0.102  0.133 -0.076  0.169 0.095  0.132 
trend 0.000  0.001 -0.001  0.000 -0.003  0.000 
inst*child06 -0.009 ** 0.004 0.001   0.003 0.017 *** 0.003 
pol*child06 0.002   0.003 0.007 *** 0.002 0.011 *** 0.002 
inst*old70 -0.030 *** 0.006 -0.009   0.007 0.002   0.007 
pol*old70 -0.011 * 0.006 0.012 * 0.007 0.007   0.006 
VPC_overall 0.114   0.067   0.073   
VPC_level 2 0.593   0.489   0.525   
6.2.2 The role of flexicurity 
In the last set of regressions, we focus more specifically on the impact of flexicurity on 
women labour market involvement by disentangling the impact of the two components of 
the indicator INST: flexibility (FLEX) and security (SEC) and their interaction 
(FLEXICURITY). 
The results for the activity rate and participation rate are reported in Table 17. 
The table shows that a higher degree of labour flexibility has a positive effect on employment 
and activity rates only if it is accompanied by policies aimed at guaranteeing access to 
employment security. At the same time, a larger degree of security is beneficial for women 
involvement only in sufficiently flexible labour markets that provide easier access to 
employment. Such effects are stronger for women who are more involved in family duties 
such as childcare and elderly care. These results suggest that combining a high degree of 
labour-market flexibility with a high level of social protection leads to significant gains in 
terms of women labour-market participation, while omitting one of these two factor can 
produce a sub-optimal (or even negative) outcome in terms of employment performance. 
The marginal effect of flexibility on the employment (activity) rate turns out to be positive in 
correspondence to a value of the security indicator above 1.66 (1.57). On the other hand, the 
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marginal effect of security on the employment (activity) rate turns out to be positive for a 
value of the flexibility indicator above 1.77 (1.75). 
Table 17. Two-level probit regression: The impact of flexibility and security - whole sample 
  Employment   Activity 
 Coef  Std. Err  Coef.  Std. Err 
          
flex -0.274 ** 0.129  -0.157 * 0.091 
security -0.287 ** 0.113  -0.175 ** 0.089 
flexicurity=flex x security 0.164 *** 0.057  0.099 ** 0.039 
flex_child-0-6 -0.069 *** 0.003  -0.067 *** 0.003 
security_child-0-6 -0.038 *** 0.004  -0.014 *** 0.004 
flexicurity_child0-6 0.026 *** 0.002  0.020 *** 0.002 
fex_old_70 -0.019 *** 0.006  -0.021 *** 0.005 
security_old_70 -0.031 *** 0.008  -0.036 *** 0.008 
flexicurity_old-70 0.008   0.005  0.007   0.005 
VPC_overall 0.041       0.224     
VPC_level 2 0.042       0.264     
 
In Figure 10 we can observe that in the period 2004-09, the countries for which both the 
flexibility and security indicators are above the estimated thresholds are the Nordic countries 
(although only marginally for Sweden), the Netherlands and at the margin Belgium, Austria, 
Germany and Ireland. After the institutional reforms implemented in the late 1990s and early 
2000s to promote a more flexible labour market, Italy still appears deficient on the security 
side. The opposite holds for France and Spain, which are still characterized by a rigid labour 
market. Greece and Portugal remain well below the thresholds. 
Figure 10. The two dimensions of flexicurity - Flexibility vs. security 
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Finally, in Tables 18 and 19 we run the same regressions for women in different age groups 
and with different levels of education respectively. The impacts of flexibility, security and 
their interactions are significant and qualitatively the same across age groups, although the 
estimated coefficients are stronger for women at the early stages of their working careers. 
The disincentive effect of flexibility on labour supply appears significantly stronger among 
low-skilled women; this effect is statistically significant when women are involved in 
childcare activity despite their level of education. 
 
Table 18. Two-level probit regression: The impact of flexibility and security - age groups 
  Employment   
  25-34     35-44     45-54       
 Coef  
Std. 
Err Coef  
Std. 
Err Coef  
Std. 
Err  
              
Flex -0.195   0.136 -0.313 ** 0.137 -0.106   0.074  
security -0.218 * 0.121 -0.306 ** 0.126 -0.129 *** 0.052  
flexicurity=flex x security 0.129 ** 0.055 0.171 *** 0.069 0.076 *** 0.026  
flex_child-0-6 -0.081 *** 0.004 -0.067 *** 0.005 -0.048 *** 0.012  
security_child-0-6 -0.046 *** 0.006 -0.067 *** 0.007 -0.037 * 0.020  
flexicurity_child0-6 0.039 *** 0.003 0.036 *** 0.004 0.021 ** 0.010  
flex_old_70 -0.009   0.012 -0.043 *** 0.009 -0.014   0.009  
security_old_70 -0.022   0.017 -0.040 *** 0.014 -0.026 ** 0.013  
flexicurity_old-70 0.013   0.011 0.019 ** 0.008 -0.003   0.008  
VPC_overall 0.287     0.041     0.259       
VPC_level 2 0.328     0.042     0.564       
 Activity  
  
25-34     35-44     45-54     
  
 Coef  
Std. 
Err Coef  
Std. 
Err Coef  
Std. 
Err  
              
flex -0.197   0.139 -0.131   0.094 -0.057  0.072  
security -0.168 * 0.098 -0.132   0.097 -0.044  0.070  
flexicurity=flex x security 0.095 * 0.050 0.084 * 0.044 0.029  0.033  
flex_child-0-6 -0.056 *** 0.004 -0.069 *** 0.004 -0.044  0.011  
security_child-0-6 0.021 *** 0.006 -0.067 *** 0.007 -0.022  0.019  
flexicurity_child0-6 0.019 *** 0.003 0.038 *** 0.003 0.016  0.009  
flex_old_70 -0.027 ** 0.011 -0.033 *** 0.009 -0.010  0.008  
security_old_70 -0.042 *** 0.016 -0.036 *** 0.013 -0.017  0.012  
flexicurity_old-70 0.022 ** 0.010 0.010   0.008 -0.007  0.007  
VPC_overall 0.257     0.308     0.333       
VPC_level 2 0.287     0.385     0.589       
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Table 19. Two-level probit regression: The impact of flexibility and security - education levels 
  Employment 
  
ISCED 
0-2     
ISCED 
3-5     
ISCED 
5-7     
 Coef  
Std. 
Err Coef  
Std. 
Err Coef  
Std. 
Err 
             
flex -0.393 ** 0.201 -0.024   0.068 -0.051   0.063 
security -0.379 *** 0.115 -0.041   0.067 -0.072   0.064 
flexicurity=flex x security 0.241 *** 0.056 0.011   0.032 0.015   0.029 
flex_child-0-6 -0.066 *** 0.005 -0.090 *** 0.005 -0.056 *** 0.005 
security_child-0-6 -0.038 *** 0.008 -0.073 *** 0.007 -0.004   0.007 
flexicurity_child0-6 0.024 *** 0.005 0.045 *** 0.004 0.012 *** 0.004 
flex_old_70 -0.008   0.009 -0.023 ** 0.011 -0.008   0.011 
security_old_70 -0.010   0.013 -0.056 *** 0.016 -0.016   0.016 
flexicurity_old-70 -0.012   0.008 0.025 *** 0.009 0.010   0.010 
VPC_overall 0.053     0.201     0.209     
VPC_level 2 0.054     0.319     0.306     
 Activity 
  
ISCED 
0-2     
ISCED 
3-5     
ISCED 
5-7     
 Coef  
Std. 
Err Coef  
Std. 
Err Coef  
Std. 
Err 
             
flex -0.136   0.149 -0.002   0.064 -0.002   0.046 
security -0.242 * 0.149 0.022   0.063 0.022   0.049 
flexicurity=flex x security 0.133 *** 0.054 -0.026   0.032 -0.026   0.025 
flex_child-0-6 -0.067 *** 0.005 -0.084 *** 0.005 -0.084 *** 0.004 
security_child-0-6 -0.010   0.008 -0.048 *** 0.006 -0.048 *** 0.006 
flexicurity_child0-6 0.019 *** 0.004 0.038 *** 0.003 0.038 *** 0.003 
flex_old_70 -0.002   0.009 -0.048 *** 0.010 -0.048 *** 0.009 
security_old_70 -0.013   0.013 -0.078 *** 0.014 -0.078 *** 0.014 
flexicurity_old-70 -0.017 ** 0.008 0.035 *** 0.008 0.035 *** 0.009 
VPC_overall 0.365     0.211     0.211     
VPC_level 2 0.418     0.322     0.323     
7. Conclusions 
Female participation and employment rates in the EU have increased substantially over the 
last two decades, yielding to a gradual decline in the employment gender gap. In many 
countries the observed patterns in both participation and employment have occurred in 
conjunction with a progressive deregulation of the labour market and a growing attention to 
policy interventions aimed at increasing women’s labour market participation. 
Our analysis provides evidence on trends of women labour market involvement (both in 
quantitative and qualitative terms) by looking at the evolution of women labour market 
outcomes over time and across different welfare regimes. 
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Once individual characteristics and country-specific factors have been controlled for, we 
document an increase in female labour force participation with respect to men with 
comparable qualifications across welfare regimes. We also find that an increase in women 
labour market participation (with respect to men) is associated with larger shares of women 
in temporary and part-time jobs in southern European countries. In contrast, in Nordic 
countries the increase in women labour participation is associated with larger shares of 
women in full-time employment. These results are mainly driven by women in prime-age, 
i.e. 25-54 years of age, and with a low level of education. This suggests that on the one hand 
the increasing availability of ‘atypical’ jobs and more flexible forms of employment may have 
helped women to better integrate in the labour market and narrow the employment gap with 
men. On the other, this integration process has mainly occurred at the expense of an 
increasing gender gap in terms of quality of occupation, to the extent that differences across 
genders in the ‘quality’ of occupation are not fully explained by different preferences or 
productivity of men and women. This seems to be particularly true in those countries, such 
as the southern countries, where family-oriented policies are still less developed and, at the 
same time, the extended family (traditionally a source of support) has been gradually 
evolving into the smaller nuclear family. 
Our regression analysis reveals that individual characteristics still play an important role in 
shaping women labour market behaviour, although the impact is mediated by the 
institutional and political context in which women function. In particular, household-care 
burdens appear as the key factors influencing participation rate. In this respect, along with 
the presence of children especially of pre-school age, the rapid ageing of the population has 
motivated an increasing interest towards the effects of elderly care on female labour supply. 
Our results show that, between 1994 and 2009, participation and employment increased for 
women with small children. However, such an increase has not been uniform across welfare 
regimes. Indeed, the negative impact of young children on women labour market 
involvement declined significantly in Social Democratic countries and to a less extent in 
continental and southern countries, while no trend has been detected for the UK. At the same 
time, the negative impact of informal elderly care on employment and participation has 
increased over time. Indeed, according to our results, the presence of a co-habiting elderly 
person has a positive (and significant) impact on female labour market involvement at the 
beginning of a sample period and then turns negative. This seems to be related to the 
changing role of elderly relatives within the family, from providers of unpaid help in 
household and childcare activities within the extended family to recipients of informal long-
term care in the nuclear family. 
These trends are related to the institutional and policy changes that have been introduced in 
almost all European countries since the end of the 1990s. Such changes had an important 
impact on the labour market ‘opportunities’ of women by affecting the quality of potential 
jobs available, the chance to (re-)enter the labour market and the opportunity costs of 
employment (vs. non-employment). 
A central result of our multi-level analysis is that, contrary to conventional assumptions, 
women’s labour supply response to childcare and elderly care may be different, because 
women react differently to policy incentives and institutional roles according to the type of 
household care burden. One possible reason for the observed differences is the fact that an 
elderly person often contributes with his or her pension to the household income, thus 
increasing the reservation wage at which women are available to work. This implies that the 
discouraging impact of care for the elderly is different from that of children care and it is 
stronger for low-skilled women (whose labour market opportunities are poor) and in the 
presence of large cash benefits. 
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The results of the multi-level estimation go to this direction. The observed change in the 
attitude towards work of on the part women with children has been encouraged by the 
expansion of flexible forms of employment (fixed-term contracts and part-time jobs), which 
have progressively eased the labour market access and the reconciliation of family/child 
responsibilities with paid work. This positive effect is stronger for women in the early stage 
of their work life regardless of their level of education. Generous child benefits and 
maternity/paternity leave have a positive impact on labour market attachment of young 
women, and the effect is stronger for medium/highly educated groups. 
Family subsidies work in the opposite direction for low-skilled women with elderly care 
responsibilities, since monetary subsidies have a stronger income effect on those individuals 
with a lower market wage. Interestingly, the deregulation of the labour market has a 
negative impact on the participation rate of women co-habiting with an elderly relative. Such 
effect holds for low-medium educated women (whose work propensity is lower and work 
opportunities are poorer in general) but not for well educated women whose labour market 
opportunities (and the quality of job opportunities) are less susceptible to institutional 
changes. 
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Appendix 1. The Vigdor Index 
A1.1 Methodological framework 
Let us define D to be a binary variable taking the value 0 if the individual is in group 0, 1 if 
he/she is in group 1. 
We are interested in assessing differences between group 0 and group 1 using a one-
dimensional measure of how different are the distributions of some characteristics x between 
group 0 and 1. 
Let us denote by  xf0  the density function of x among group 0 individuals (reference 
group),  xf1  the density function of x among group 1 individuals. 
Vigdor (2008) estimates a model for 
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where p is the proportion of group 1 individuals in the population and  xf  is the density 
function of x in the population. A generalization of the Vigdor index which is between zero 
and one and is composition invariant (i.e. it does not depend on p) is: 
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Such an analysis is based on the ratio      xfxfxg 10 /  which will be equal to 1 if group 0 
and 1 have the same distribution of x. This implies that any difference in the observed x will 
result in a discrepancy between group 0 and 1 in the synthetic index. 
 An important empirical issue is that there might be some characteristics – let us denote these 
by z – whose differences between group 0 and 1 are not appropriate to take into 
consideration in infering a behavioural difference between group 0 and 1. For example, we 
might not want to label differences in the age structures between the two groups as 
differences in labour market behaviour between the two groups. The unconditional 
distribution of x (as in (A1.1)) will be different if individuals in group 0 and 1 have a 
different distribution of z. An analysis based on (A1.1) would be misleading. For example, if 
group 0 and group 1 are women and men, we do not want to capture differences in labour 
market performance between women and men due to different gender population structure. 
Gender demographic trends are correlated to differences in employment, labour market 
participation or job types, but they are not a matter of research themselves. Therefore, we 
need to work with the distribution of x given z. 
Denote by  zxf |0  the density function of x given z among group 0 individuals,  zxf |1  
the density function of x given z among group 1 individuals. Define the marginal 
distributions of z among group 0 and 1,  zh0  and  zh1  respectively. We are thus interested 
in the ratio between density functions: 
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A generalization of the Vigdor index that allows for the presence of z variables, while 
remaining composition invariant, is:13 
 
    
 dxdzzhzxf
zxg
I 11 ||1
12        (A1.3)  
Empirically, one has to get an estimate of  zxg | . One way to proceed is as follows. 
Estimate a probit model for being an individual of group 1 on x and z: 
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We can write: 
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Substituting into (A1.2) we have that: 
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Estimate a probit model for being an individual of group 1 conditional on z alone: 
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Substituting into (A1.5) we have that: 
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In short, the relative densities of x conditional on z can be estimated from the predicted 
probabilities of two probits for being an individual in group 1, one conditional on x and z 
and the other conditional on z alone. 
Having  zxg |  on hand, the average value of the transformation   zxg |1/1   across 
group 1 individuals, will then give the synthetic index (A1.3).14 
                                                   
13 The Vigdor index (Vigdor, 2008) is derived for a value of p=0.5 and does not explicitly deal with 
differences between x and z variables. 
14 Such an analysis has been used in the book Cultural Integration of Immigrants in Europe, edited by 
Yann Algan, Alberto Bisin, Alan Manning and Thierry Verdier, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
forthcoming (http://ukcatalogue.oup.com/product/9780199660094.do#.UGG03c2RY8Z) to study 
cultural and economic integration patterns of immigrants in Europe. 
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A1.2 Adaptation to our setting 
 In our analysis we define D as a dummy taking 1 if the individual is female (disadvantaged 
group) and 0 otherwise. We consider four x variables, 4,...,1, kxk : 
 - 1x : dummy taking value 1 if the individual is inactive, and 0 if active (participation rate); 
 - 2x : dummy taking value 1 if the active individual is employed, and 0 if unemployed 
(unemployment rate); 
 - 3x : dummy taking value 1 if the employed individual is temporary, and 0 if permanent; 
and 
 - 4x : dummy taking value 1 if the employed individual is part-time, and 0 if full-time. 
We use as control variables z the individual education level, marital status, partner 
education, number of children and age. 
We thus derive four synthetic indicators (activity index, employment index, type of contract 
index 1 and type of contract index 2, respectively) for each European country and each year 
between 1994-2000 (ECHP) and  between 2004-09 (EU-SILC) and we perform T-test statistics 
to assess significant difference between the begin and the end of the observed time window. 
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Appendix 2. Synthetic indicator: Complete list of results 
Table A1. Activity gap by country and year 
 Year 
Country 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 P-VALUE 
AT  0.8742 0.9031 0.9068 0.8954 0.9139 0.9192 0.9161 0.9126 0.9176 0.9232 0.9260 0.9443 0.0000 
BE 0.9427 0.9394 0.9384 0.9348 0.9550 0.9547 0.9555 0.9587 0.9676 0.9685 0.9749 0.9763 0.9754 0.0000 
DE 0.9622 0.9622 0.9622 0.9622 0.9622 0.9622 0.9622  0.9622 0.9622 0.9622 0.9622 0.9622 0.5761 
DK 0.9858 0.9844 0.9783 0.9829 0.9859 0.9897 0.9899 0.9834 0.9931 0.9905 0.9936 0.9907 0.9984 0.0000 
ES 0.7959 0.7916 0.7958 0.8054 0.8152 0.8328 0.8408 0.8961 0.9021 0.9147 0.9285 0.9391 0.9454 0.0000 
FI   0.9975 0.9972 0.9943 0.9933 0.9954 0.9872 0.9889 0.9884 0.9869 0.9856 0.9811 0.0000 
FR 0.9521 0.9293 0.9234 0.9280 0.9349 0.9437 0.9444 0.9797 0.9824 0.9874 0.9888  0.9843 0.0000 
GR 0.8104 0.8167 0.8089 0.8197 0.8266 0.8114 0.8405 0.8937 0.9000 0.9005 0.9073 0.9148 0.9201 0.0000 
IE 0.7166 0.7383 0.7744 0.7903 0.8129 0.8430 0.8632 0.9094 0.9020 0.8871 0.9106 0.9048 0.9094 0.0000 
IT 0.8110 0.8287 0.8269 0.8398 0.8477 0.8604 0.8499 0.9275 0.9191 0.9173 0.9213 0.9203 0.9287 0.0000 
LU  0.7657 0.7573 0.7883 0.7929 0.7949 0.8084 0.8741 0.8829 0.8844 0.9146 0.9166 0.9128 0.0000 
NL 0.9311 0.9608 0.9567 0.9623 0.9708 0.9706 0.9676  0.8974 0.9523 0.9596 0.9672 0.9747 0.0000 
PT 0.8719 0.8894 0.9058 0.9132 0.9151 0.9278 0.9279 0.9537 0.9614 0.9649 0.9727 0.9638 0.9657 0.0000 
SE    0.9962 0.9962 0.9962 0.9962 0.9962 0.9962 0.9962 0.9962 0.9962 0.9962 0.6140 
UK 0.9521 0.9578 0.9572 0.9533 0.9583 0.9622 0.9621  0.9649 0.9545 0.9738 0.9686 0.9693 0.0008 
Note: Missing values denote missing information in the original sample. P-values contain significance values of mean-comparison tests  
between the synthetic indicators at the beginning and at the end of the time window. 
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Table A2. Employment gap by country and year 
 Year 
Country 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 P-VALUE 
AT  1.0000 0.9999 1.0000 0.9987 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9991 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.2003 
BE 0.9887 0.9887 0.9887 0.9887 0.9887 0.9887 0.9887 0.9887 0.9887 0.9887 0.9887 0.9887 0.9887 0.1005 
DE 0.9986 0.9978 0.9987 0.9999 0.9993 0.9989 0.9997  0.9978 1.0000 0.9993 0.9999 1.0000 0.0001 
DK 0.9975 0.9872 0.9946 0.9925 0.9931 0.9961 0.9920 0.9999 0.9994 0.9982 0.9976 0.9992 1.0000 0.0129 
ES 0.9951 0.9939 0.9943 0.9948 0.9945 0.9912 0.9868 0.9833 0.9844 0.9852 0.9848 0.9949 0.9987 0.0121 
FI   1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.2797 
FR 0.9964 0.9926 0.9949 0.9931 0.9902 0.9895 0.9904 0.9997 0.9982 0.9959 0.9958  0.9999 0.0008 
GR 0.9788 0.9809 0.9830 0.9851 0.9865 0.9870 0.9922 0.9870 0.9866 0.9845 0.9872 0.9920 0.9932 0.0005 
IE 0.9686 0.9722 0.9771 0.9688 0.9780 0.9901 0.9996 0.9924 0.9904 0.9925 0.9945 0.9860 0.9825 0.0011 
IT 0.9948 0.9961 0.9953 0.9926 0.9948 0.9935 0.9954 0.9933 0.9921 0.9914 0.9920 0.9912 0.9920 0.0869 
LU  1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.3528 
NL 0.9765 0.9637 0.9718 0.9702 0.9735 0.9704 0.9801  0.9997 0.9997 1.0000 1.0000 0.9998 0.0000 
PT 0.9944 0.9983 0.9939 0.9987 0.9968 0.9981 0.9988 0.9994 0.9954 0.9984 0.9992 0.9969 0.9997 0.0226 
SE    1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9503 
UK 0.9865 0.9966 0.9926 0.9965 0.9955 0.9956 0.9996  0.9989 0.9954 0.9967 0.9967 0.9959 0.0000 
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Table A3. Part-time employment gap by country and year 
 Year 
Country 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 P-VALUE 
AT   0.8877 0.8875 0.8749 0.8645 0.8493 0.8383 0.8190 0.7773 0.8259 0.7954 0.8041 0.8027 0.0000 
BE  0.8650 0.8763 0.8797 0.8704 0.8593 0.8785 0.8197 0.8328 0.8281 0.8217 0.8249 0.8270 0.0197 
DE  0.9128 0.8997 0.8938 0.9007 0.9153 0.8998  0.7167 0.7605 0.7412 0.7585 0.7726 0.0000 
DK  0.9302 0.9302 0.9302 0.9302 0.9302 0.9302 0.9302 0.9302 0.9302 0.9302 0.9302 0.9302 0.3640 
ES  0.9402 0.9402 0.9402 0.9402 0.9402 0.9402 0.9402 0.9402 0.9402 0.9402 0.9402 0.9402 0.1604 
FI   0.9891 0.9842 0.9842 0.9902 0.9881 0.9749 0.9737 0.9694 0.9737 0.9715 0.9750 0.0004 
FR  0.9307 0.9265 0.9234 0.9421 0.9412 0.9450 0.8870 0.8850 0.8764 0.8829  0.8862 0.0000 
GR  0.9644 0.9544 0.9497 0.9495 0.9483 0.9421 0.9467 0.9304 0.9439 0.9441 0.9423 0.9477 0.0353 
IE  0.8635 0.8635 0.8635 0.8635 0.8635 0.8635 0.8635 0.8635 0.8635 0.8635 0.8635 0.8635 0.2439 
IT  0.9383 0.9379 0.9372 0.9325 0.9295 0.9303 0.9089 0.8939 0.9011 0.8953 0.8923 0.9038 0.0000 
LU   0.9160 0.8690 0.9036 0.9077 0.9025 0.8747 0.8628 0.8467 0.8332 0.8449 0.8336 0.0001 
NL  0.6658 0.6556 0.6811 0.6707 0.6614 0.6733  0.6299 0.6175 0.6240 0.6280 0.6292 0.0088 
PT  0.9596 0.9598 0.9543 0.9591 0.9506 0.9654 0.9714 0.9771 0.9799 0.9721 0.9718 0.9736 0.0468 
SE    0.9558 0.9413 0.9708 0.9647 0.8911 0.8770 0.8939 0.8871 0.8714 0.8638 0.0000 
UK  0.8210 0.8300 0.8346 0.8405 0.8429 0.8310  0.8485 0.8317 0.8431  0.8531 0.0138 
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Table A4. Temporary employment gap by country and year 
 Year 
Country 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 P-VALUE 
AT  1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9626 0.9698 0.9708 0.9687 0.9710 0.9786 0.0000 
BE  1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9590 0.9531 0.9523 0.9634 0.9508 0.9548 0.0000 
DE  1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000  0.9762 0.9760 0.9554 0.9853 0.9884 0.0000 
DK  0.9812 0.9951 0.9856 0.9834 0.9716 0.9821 0.9357 0.9385 0.9290 0.9479 0.8848 0.8952 0.0000 
ES  1.0000 0.9937 1.0000 0.9902 0.9957 0.9882 0.9696 0.9621 0.9594 0.9593 0.9625 0.9669 0.0000 
FI   0.9690 0.9547 0.9627 0.9610 0.9572 0.8910 0.8878 0.8945 0.8919 0.8989 0.9168 0.0000 
FR  0.9658 0.9528 0.9655 0.9561 0.9558 0.9561 0.9616 0.9561 0.9539 0.9449  0.9521 0.0000 
GR  0.9865 0.9684 0.9852 0.9424 0.9435 0.9564 0.9393 0.9422 0.9452 0.9533 0.9464 0.9463 0.0000 
IE  0.9407 0.9418 0.9479 0.9509 0.9575 0.9487 0.9238 0.9179 0.9210 0.8955 0.9104 0.9049 0.0000 
IT  0.9430 0.9444 0.9363 0.9373 0.9433 0.9305 0.9256 0.9247 0.9226 0.9231 0.9298 0.9302 0.0000 
LU   0.9794 1.0000 0.9874 0.9821 0.9783 0.9747 0.9830 0.9832 1.0000 0.9956 0.9995 0.0000 
NL  1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000  0.9286 0.9201 0.9082 0.8950 0.9038 0.0000 
PT  1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9696 0.9668 0.9744 0.9711 0.9717 0.9811 0.0000 
SE    0.9576 0.9668 0.9778 0.9712 0.9269 0.9003 0.9395 0.9357 0.9416 0.9483 0.0027 
UK  0.9677 0.9677 0.9677 0.9677 0.9677 0.9677  0.9677 0.9677 0.9677  0.9677 0.1160 
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Appendix 3. Multi-level Analysis 
The methodological framework 
A3.1 The random intercept model 
Let *ijy  be the latent variable for individual i in region j. We observe the dichotomous 
response variable ijy , which takes value 1 if the individual individual i in country j is 
employed (or active) and 0 otherwise. Let ijx  be a r×1 vector of individual and household 
characteristics and ijz  be a t×1 vector of characteristics of the country of residence. ju0  is the 
random effect, or level-2 residual for region j, with ju 0   20,0 uN  ; ij   2,0 N  is the 
level-1 residual. ju 0  and ij  are independent. 
The random intercept model is composed of a level-1 model (the individual level): 
ijijjjijy   xα0         (A3.1) 
and a level-2 model (the country-level): 
αα
βz


j
jjj u000 
         (A3.2) 
where 0  is a constant and β  is a t×1 vector of coefficients. Notice that, at this stage, jα  is 
constant across countries. This notional complication will turn useful later on. Hence, the 
combined random-intercept model is given by: 
jijijjij uy 00   αxβz  
The probability of observing a positive response on the outcome variable is specified as: 
       ijjijy αxβz01Pr  
where    is the standard normal cumulative distribution function. The likelihood 
contribution of an individual i in region j, conditional on ju0 , is: 
       ijij yyjij uL  10 1|   
Integrating the random term ju0  out, the previous likelihood reads as: 
        
 jj
yy
ij duuL ijij 00
11   
Hence, let   be the variance matrix of the regional random effects, the overall likelihood 
function is: 
        

j i
jj
yy duuL ijij 00
11,   
 The likelihood function is approximated via a Gauss-Hermite quadrature. 
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A3.1.1  The random coefficient model 
The random intercept model above is a simplified version of more complex multilevel 
models, where the relationships between the first level explanatory variables and the 
outcome of interest may differ across level-2 units. This possibility is modelled by 
introducing random slopes for level-1 explanatory variables. 
 The random-coefficient model is composed by the two levels described in the previous 
section (A3.1) and (A3.2), where the vector of regression coefficients on the level-1 
explanatory variables is allowed to depend on a set of country-specific characteristics jz  and 
on a further stochastic component: 
jjj uγzα  0          (A3.3) 
Combining (A3.1)-(A3.2)- (A3.3), the random-coefficient model is given by: 
  jijijjjjij uy 000   xuγzβz  
The model is then composed of r+1 vector of random coefficients, ju0  and ju . The vector (
ju0 , ju1 ,..., rju ) has a multivariate normal distribution with zero mean and constant 
covariance matrix, which is independent on ij . 
The probability of observing a positive response on the outcome variable is specified as: 
        ijjjijy xγzβz 001Pr  
The likelihood contribution of an individual i in region j, conditional on ju0  and ju , is: 
       ijij yyjjij uL  10 1,|  u  
Integrating the random terms ju0  and ju  out, the previous likelihood reads as: 
          


 jjjj
yy
ij dduuL ijij uu 00
11   
Hence, let Ω be the variance matrix of the regional random effects, the overall likelihood 
function is: 
           



j i
jjjj
yy dduuL ijij uu 00
11,   
The likelihood function is approximated via a Gauss-Hermite quadrature. 
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